212286

JPRS-TAC-85-010 22 May 1985

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER ON GENEVA TALKS, CSCE

PM051230 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: "New Chapter in East-West Relations"]

[Text] The start of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union 12 March in Geneva...marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. Not only are Washington and Moscow in agreement on returning to their seats at the negotiating table, they have given these negotiations a new and complex character, which in the dialogue on arms control includes certain essential issues which affect the balance between the military forces of East and West in their interdependence, as well as the balance between offensive and defensive weapons.

Moreover, Washington and Moscow have reached agreement on some ambitious aims: to draft effective agreements with a view to preventing an arms race in space and ending the arms race on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and to consolidate strategic stability. The aim agreed upon 8 January between the United States and the Soviet Union, which is to attempt to prevent an arms race in space, represents an attempt at preventive arms control. At the same time, Geneva gives the Soviet Union the opportunity to improve through negotiation the situation created by the advance in SS-20's.

The aim of the negotiations on arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as on arms control between East and West in general, remains the establishment of a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level. This requires respect for the legitimate interests of all participants regarding security. It also requires readiness to create confidence by means of greater openness and effective verification, both in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations and in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in the Vienna MBFR negotiations, and in the negotiations on the total worldwide banning of chemical weapons in the framework of the Geneva disarmament conference.

In many respects conditions are favorable for a new stage in a policy of realistic detente. Nevertheless, excessive expectations on the part of the public would be of no assistance....

President Reagan's wish to use his second term to open a new chapter in relations with the Soviet Union is accompanied by the Europeans' desire to give new impetus to the CSCE process in all spheres. It is auspicious that at this time the United States is led by a president confirmed in office and the Soviet Union by a new general secretary. A meeting between these two personalities in the course of this year could favorably influence future developments.

The new stage in East-West relations could receive a strong impetus from the Geneva negotiations. These place the elements of security in a broad context and in a long-term perspective. Because strategic arms, medium-range weapons, and space systems are the subject matter of the negotiations, essential aspects of the balance of forces between the big powers, the European situation as regards security, and further, more far-reaching developments are interlinked.

The subject matter of the Geneva negotiations affects the Europeans' basic interests in regard to security and the essential issues connected with the Western alliance's joint security. We are therefore pleased that the Americans are prepared to promote a series of comprehensive consultations, which will accompany the Geneva negotiating process and give us the opportunity to take part in it.

What matters is to safeguard fully the alliance's strategic unity, avert instability, and enable the U.S. allies in West Europe to take part in the progress of the negotiations by means of meticulous and uninhibited consultations, and not find themsleves excluded from technological innovation.

As long as there is no better strategy than that of preventing war, the strategy of flexible response should retain its full validity. It is a strategy appropriate to that purpose; nothing, absolutely nothing, should happen to jeopardize that lofty moral aim. Therefore every new process should be assessed as to whether or not it brings us closer to the aim of preventing war. Nothing should happen which would make possible a war in Europe, because even a war waged solely with conventional weapons would be a catastrophe much worse even than World War II for the peoples of Europe, in view of the state of technology.

It must not be forgotten that the alliance's current strategy is also a response to the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional weapons in Europe. The appraisal of the new possibilities aimed at consolidating strategic stability should therefore, as far as Europe is concerned, also include the means of reducing the imbalance at the conventional level. It is for this reason that the Vienna MBFR negotiations remain important for us. The Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe could create a broader basis and a more long-term perspective for the discussion of security issues throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the long term, a stabilization of the balance of conventional forces in Europe, thanks to arms control, will be an essential task of this conference.

It will be important to organize in a balanced manner the new stage in East-West relations which is going to begin. This applies to the participation of the superpowers and of other CSCE states; to the relationship between security issues, political relations, and cooperation in all spheres of mutual interest; to the relationship between the superpowers' negotiations in Geneva and the multilateral negotiations, and to global developments' influence on the situation in Europe and on the relationship between the superpowers: Hence the importance, too, of the talks begun between Washington and Moscow on the Near East and the need to include other areas of conflict. Last, it applies to the bilateral relations of all the participants: Nobody can or should be excluded or omitted from this. Both the People's Republic of Poland and the GDR should be included in this new stage of East-West relations.

It is very important that the Europeans not confine themselves to the role of spectators in the negotiations between the big superpowers. After maintaining the network of East-West relations during the period when contacts between them were disturbed, henceforth we European should ensure that the new stage is not confined to the relationship

between the superpowers and security issues, but includes East-West relations as a whole and fully benefits Europe. Last, in this new stage of detente, it is necessary to carefully take into account political relations and economic and cultural cooperation, together with the large place reserved for security elements.

It is therefore a matter of taking advantage at the political level of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1985 to give new impetus to the CSCE process.... We want healthy economic development for the states of Eastern Europe. They can only resolve by themselves the problems which they have as a result of their socialist system, but we have no interest in exacerbating them.

Cooperation between the complementary economies of East and West could become a stable bridge leading to a new technological era. The new problems, such as the dangers threatening our common environment, which do not stop at the systems' borders, confront us with new tasks and new forms of cooperation. The human elements should take their fitting place in all the efforts at detente and cooperation.

Last, human dignity should remain the aim of all state activity. That is why the meeting on human rights scheduled for May in Ottawa is of great importance. This meeting must be not a confrontation, but a sincere discussion and a joint search for means which would make it possible to give people the rights and living conditions to which they are entitled by virtue of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid final document. To seek confrontation would be detrimental to practical policy in regard to human rights. What matters is the results achieved in favor of many human lives....

The European cultural forum which will take place in Budapest will also be of some political importance. Europe's cultural identity is stronger than all the borders between the systems. To promote it is therefore a forward-looking policy oriented toward a peaceful Europe.

The EC member states have played an important role in concluding the Helsinki Final Act and in encouraging the CSCE process. They must increase their cohesion even further in order to perform the task incumbent upon them in the new stage of East-West relations. This includes strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance by relaunching West European unity, within which European interests regarding security, as well as the new processes, should be defined and harmonized in a uniform manner. It also includes decisive progress in building European political unity.

As for the FRG, the treaties signed in the seventies with its Eastern neighbors also continue to constitute a sound basis for the new stage in East-West relations.... In this stage, too, the two German states are assigned an important task. We wish to make increasingly large the set of responsibilities on which the FRG and the GDR are in agreement....

Inter-German Relations

The two German states should set an example to ensure that a war never again starts from German soil; on the contrary, they should be an impetus for peace. This is in keeping with the interests of all our neighbors. The FRG's relations with the GDR will continue simultaneously to influence the state of East-West relations and to depend on them. The need for a German identity is reviving: This is natural, and it is good that it should be so.

The organization of relations with the GDR and the other Warsaw Pact states should at no time neglect the central importance of long-term relations with the Soviet Union. German-Soviet relations will remain of great importance for the development of East-West relations in Europe. These relations could also have favorable effects on security issues.

In 1985, 40 years after the end of the most terrible war and of the beginning of the period of peace in Europe, we should institute measures aimed at a lasting peace in Europe, to enable it to go down in history as a continent of peace in contrast to the wars and violence there in the course of history.

CSO: 5200/2569

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG DAILY ACCUSES EAST OF EXPLOITING GENEVA TALKS

DW049053 Bonn DIE WELT in German 4-5 Apr 85 p 1

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "The East Uses Geneva Again for a Propaganda Offensive"]

[Excerpt] Bonn -- A few weeks after the beginning of U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of space systems and nuclear weapons, the Warsaw Pact began to publish details of Soviet proposals, although it was agreed to handle the matter strictly confidentially.

The fact that RUDE PRAVO, the Czechoslovak Communist Party central organ, now repeats almost verbatim in an editorial on the Soviet Union's position in the Geneva talks what a correspondent of ADN, the East Berlin news agency, reported on 29 March from Brussels, is considered by Western experts as indicating that Moscow is more interested in exerting propagandistic influence on the Western public than in the outcome of the Geneva talks.

It was further stressed that the Soviet Union is thus keeping to the method already used in negotiations on the limitation of intermediate-range weapons. For Moscow, arms control negotiations are not a means to achieve an arms reduction treaty but a means to weaken Western reaction to Soviet armament programs.

It is considered remarkable that the ADN correspondent quotes "well informed Brussels circles" as the source for his report, thus suggesting that he was informed by Western circles about Moscow's attitude.

CSO: 5200/2569

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SYDNEY EDITORIAL ADVISES PATIENCE IN U.S.-USSR TALKS

Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 8 Jan 85 p 6

[Text] The arms control talks in Geneva between the US Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Andrei Gromyko, are not likely to produce any dramatic breakthroughs. The nuclear terror under which the world labours is certain to continue into the foreseeable future.

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There are fundamental conflicts in arms control thinking between the Americans and the Soviets. The Soviets have stated that significant progress in arms control cannot be made unless the Americans agree to abandon, or at least significantly curtail, research and development of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars.

The Americans, on the other hand, are proposing deep reductions in levels of both sides' offensive weapons. At the same time they are preaching the virtues of defensive technology of the Star Wars type, saying that they offer in the long run the chance to free the world from the threat of mutual assured destruction. To the US, Star Wars is not a bargaining chip.

However, there are other major obstacles in the way of concluding a successful arms control treaty. One is the record of Soviet cheating on previous arms control agreements. The American administration has released details of substantial Soviet avoidance of the provisions of previous treaties. The spirit, if not the letter, of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty appears to have been broken by the Soviets' construction of a major anti-ballistic missile radar at Krasnoyarsk. These and other instances of Soviet cheating must be addressed if the arms control process is to demonstrate the integrity necessary for it to inspire confidence. If any future treaty is to be negotiated, the Americans will insist on a higher level of verification and enforceability than has previously been the case.

There appear to be several limits to how far the arms control process can progress. The Reagan administration has rightly insisted that the Strategic Defense Initiative is non-negotiable. The Soviets are actively pursuing the development of strategic dence themselves, but they lag behind the Americans in technology, and their struggling economy finds it difficult to carry the burdens of the large Soviet defence budget.

A largely unenforceable treaty limiting American research and development in the strategic defence area would do nothing more than allow the Soviets to catch up with Western technology, while producing no benefit for the West. The Soviets will not get away with their transparent ploy over Star Wars—a defensive system which will hurt no one—and it still remains up to them to demonstrate their alleged good faith by genuine concessions on offensive weapons. This good faith has been conspicuously lacking in the past; there is little reason now to expect a sudden light on the road to Damascus.

It should be remembered that it was the Soviets who walked out of the last round of negotiations when they could not get their own way. It is good that the US and the USSR are back at the negotiating table. But the peoples of democratic societies should bear in mind the limitations of the arms control process, and the obduracy of Soviet policy and practice, and should not expect the United States to conclude an agreement for its own sake. The recent warnings by Mr Reagan and Mr Shultz that any progress is likely to be slow and difficult should not be ignored.

CSO: 5200/4305

WEINBERGER COMMENTS ON SOVIET SPACE ARMS RESEARCH HIT

LD051343 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 5 Apr 85

[Text] Moscow, April 5, TASS--TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshov writes:

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger is finding it really hard. In the performance of his official duty he has to "push through" Congress new huge allocations for speeding up the arms race and to try to "convince" the legislators and taxpayers that there is a "Soviet military threat." He finds it particularly hard to "uphold" American plans of militarization of outer space, the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" of the United States. The more so that the attitude of that "initiative," which is more precisely called "star wars," became, in the opinion of American news analysts, the question, the touchstone which checks the loyalty to the President and, therefore, one has to "wriggle out" and invent "argumentation."

In an ABC television interview the head of the Pentagon tried to prove what cannot be proved: He was trying to prove that it is the USSR but not the USA which is carrying out a speedy rate plan of militarization of outer space. To make himself more convincing, he even cited a figure—he said that allegedly the USSR "has been doing that for almost 20 years." The defence secretary kept silent, certainly, on the fact that from the very beginning of the space era, the United States, as different from the USSR, set as one of its priority tasks "attainment of scientific—technological superiority in the use of outer space in military purposes." He has forgotten that on October 19, 1959, that is more than 25 years ago, an experiment was held in the United States in the course of which the "Explorer—6" artificial satel—lite was intercepted from a B—47 bomber. Mr. Weinberger did not recall his own statement which was made in 1982. He then said that the U.S. should have the potential that would make it possible not only to disrupt the functioning of enemy space systems but also to fully put them out of operation.

The "explanation," which was provided by the defence secretary for his own thesis on the Soviet Union's work in "creating a space defence system" is a striking example of absolute lack of logic. But the head of the Pentagon lacks not only logic. As he said, the USSR spends for works to create the space defence system almost "half of its budget or approximately the same as

is spent on offensive armaments." It turns out that almost 50 per cent--for offensive armaments, that is on the whole almost 100 per cent. Naturally the question arises about expenditures for "non-offensive," conventional armed forces of the USSR, which, according to selfsame Caspar Weinberger, "have a great might" and "pose a threat to Western Europe."

The U.S. defence secretary, though he is the political head of the Pentagon, should perhaps sometimes look into the text-book of arithmetics since in the future, too, "solutions" of difficult tasks set to him will be at variance with the correct answer. Perhaps, the matter is possibly not at all arithmetics. He just dreams of getting for his department not 100 per cent, which in the budget estimates for 1986 fiscal year amount to 313,700 million dollars (this is the 100 per cent), but, say, 150-200 per cent.

If one is to speak seriously and rest upon real facts and not concoctions, the question is absolutely clear. The Soviet Union has always advocated peaceful uses of the near-earth space and now insists on decisions to be taken on prevention of militarization of outer space. The United States stubbornly conducts works with a view of turning outer space into a battle-field. Whence the danger of "star wars" which are a threat to the whole of mankind.

cso: 1812/206

USSR: WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO SDI EXAMINED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 85 p 6 $\,$

[Article by S.Men'shikov: "The "Space Games" of the Military Complex"]

Text7 Recently I had occasion to visit the US as a member of a delegation representing the Soviet Association for the Promotion of the UN. Among our interlocutors were ordinary Americans who asked simple and clever questions, and businessmen, and military and political experts whose voice is heard in the White House. The latter included retired general B.Scowcroft, who last year headed the presidential commission on strategic forces, and president of the California-based corporation "Pan Heuristics" F.Hoffman who masterminded one of the three reports to the US president on space weaponry. There were prominent scientists who oppose the present militaristic course, and short-spoken staff from the Rand Corporation which does contract work for the Pentagon, the CIA and other agencies, and leading figures from the Space Research Laboratory near Los Angeles. In a word, the people we talked to represented a wide range of interests and viewpoints.

Yet in every case the topic that attracted the greatest interest was the future of Soviet-American relations and especially the problem of preventing an arms race in space. What our interlocutors had to say reflected the concern at present felt by millions of Americans over the "space games" of the Pentagon military clique.

We came to the US at a time when the first round of broad public debate over the Star Wars program had ended, and not in the administration's favor either. In the course of that discussion noted scientists and experts succeeded in proving that the goal originally announced by the president with such fanfare - to create a reliable antimissile shield for the US population - was clearly unattainable, at least not in the next several decades. This was publicly admitted by General J.Abrahamson, the man appointed to head the antimissile project, and the president's science adviser J.Keyworth, and other administration figures. In a foreword to the official brochure "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative" disseminated in early January Reagan himself no longer refers

to the protection of the population as an objective for the fore-seeable future. He does, however, attempt to replace the disproven thesis by vague claims to the effect that space weaponry "is meant to destroy missiles, not people".

Furthermore, the trust placed by Americans in official assurances that space weaponry is to be used for purely defensive purposes was significantly undermined. In the course of the discussion many experts made the convincing point that coupled with the continuing buildup of offensive strategic weapons the plan to develop a "total" antimissile defense (AMD) could only be construed as an aggressive act aimed at enhancing the American potential for a first nuclear strike. This was indirectly conceded by the president: "If they (i.e. space weapons) are combined with offensive systems, they could be regarded as a factor conducive to an aggressive policy".

Also proven was the fact that the space weapons program is in direct violation of the permanent Antimissile Defense Systems Limitation Treaty signed and ratified by the Soviet Union and the US in 1972. Many in the USA are aware that with the renunciation of that treaty a crucial barrier to an arms race in space would be removed, as would a powerful incentive to limit and reduce nuclear weapons as such. There are a number of outspoken opponents of the treaty in America. These are concentrated mainly in the Pentagon and the military-industrial corporations. Due, however, to a whole array of factors, particularly the influence of the Western European allies frightened by the prospect of an arms race in space, President Reagan was forced to state publicly that the US would abide by the terms of the treaty, at least in the coming few years.

Having lost the first round of the intense, nation-wide debate, Star Wars supporters have now switched to a new and wilier argument to which, as a number of Americans told us, many have no answer. Briefly, these arguments boil down to the following:

Firstly, those who champion the militarization of space insist that what is really planned is not the creation of an "absolute" antimissile shield, but merely a system to protect the launching sites of land-based intercontinental missiles; this, it is alleged, would enhance America's "deterrent capability". Secondly, the space antimissile defense program will, in their words, devalue offensive weaponry and open the door to agreements on nuclear arms reductions. Finally, during the next several years the entire project will be limited to space weaponry research only, which the ABM treaty does not forbid, and will promote (!) scientific and technological progress.

Closer examination of these arguments will reveal that they too are meant to deceive, and that behind each and every one of them there stick out the long ears of the militarists.

Let us begin with "deterrent capability". This slick phrase was coined in the US in the late 40s, when the USSR had just acquired an atomic capability of its own, and to speak of a "preventive strike" had become pointless and dangerous. The change in terminology, however, did not change the substance of the thinking. "Containment" and "deterrence" signified precisely one thing the use of nuclear arms, including a nuclear first strike.

The assumption was that the US would have a quantitative and possibly a qualitative edge in nuclear weapons: without it the ability to strike fear, or, simply put, to blackmail other countries, would simply ring hollow.

But with the advent in the 70s of nuclear parity, of a strategic equilibrium on the international arena, the doctrine of "deterrence" was left with nothing solid to stand on. The arms race, in which the initiative invariably belonged to Washington, resulted in increased vulnerability for the territory of the US itself, including its military installations. In other words, the country's national security was not enhanced. Conversations with Americans leave one with the feeling that they are well aware of this unpleasant truth. Declarations about "selective retaliation", or, in plainer language, about a "limited" nuclear war, reassured no one. Other than the most virulent hawks, nobody in America believes that a nuclear catastrophe could be localized by delivering Europeans, Asians or Africans to the slaughter.

And now the Pentagon intends to revive its "deterrent capability" by shielding American missile launch sites with space-based weapons. But no matter how many the reassurances offered by Star Wars supporters that this is a purely defensive system, one finds it impossible to believe them. Any reduction in the vulnerability of strategic weapons designed to destroy enemy launching sites is tantamount to disturbing the equilibrium achieved, to the creation of a new first-strike capability. This is precisely what the AMD treaty, whose main purpose is the prevention of nuclear aggression, is directed against.

Not one of the highly qualified specialists we conversed with could deny that space weapons have a dual significance. Lasers, particle weapons and missiles are deployed in space against enemy rockets, as well as other targets in space, in the atmosphere and on the ground. To all intents and purposes, they are a new class of offensive weaponry. It was no slip of the tongue on the part of USAF chief of staff General Charles Gabriel when, displaying an unabashed military appetite, he declared: "Space, in the final analysis, is the most advantageous position".

Several people tried to convince us that development of space weaponry will help consolidate strategic stability and even facilitate arms reduction. How, they asked, can you object to such a highly

moral and truly noble goal? However, specialists who studied the problem from both the theoretical (including the mathematical theory of games) and the practical (relations between powers) points of view have come to an almost unanimous conclusion: the Star Wars program will engender an even more intense and exhausting arms race in practically every sphere.

At Stanford University we met the widely known physicist Sidney Drell. With two other scientists he recently coauthored a comprehensive book entitled "The Reagan SDI: An Assessment from the Standpoint of Technology, Politics and Arms Control". It convincingly argues the case for a very important conclusion which many share: pushing ahead with the AMD system "would exert a destabilizing influence on the strategic balance and pose a risk to our own security". There will follow, in the words of the authors, "a needless and unbalancing acceleration of the strategic arms race".

Now for the issue of "harmless" space research. If it were a question of the peaceful exploration of space there would be no cause for any doubts or concerns whatsoever. As a matter of fact, several professors at the California Institute of Technology expressed high hopes for cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in the peaceful exploitation of space. However, the allocation by the US of 26 billion dollars for space weapons research has something completely different in mind. Here are some eloquent facts gleaned from the American press which tell the real story behind this so-called "research'.

The US Army is developing an antimissile system which could be deployed in the 1990s. This program has been in the works for 18 years (i.e. since the mid-sixties!). Tests were conducted in June 1984 in the course of which one missile warhead was intercepted and destroyed by another. These projects have now been incorporated into the Star Wars program.

The USAF is readying the construction of a new giant rocket to launch superheavy satellites for the Star Wars project and for the creation of a "not overly costly space defense system".

Under study is a project to orbit 100 satellites in the early 90s each carrying 150 interceptor rockets. In announcing the fact, three authors who support the "space games" concept - Z.Brzezinski, R.Jastrow and M.Kampelman - voiced the following opinion in the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE: "There is nothing exotic about this technology. With some additional research and experimental design work we could create and deploy a two-tier defense right now".

So the answer to the question of what the 25 billion dollars are intended for should be crystal clear.

In San Francisco local businessmen told us about the hopes for enrichment that the military-industrial complex is pinning on the

Star wars program. Firstly, the top people of the complex are thinking not in terms of tens of billions of dollars "for research", but in terms of hundreds of billions for full-scale deployment. Secondly, the aviation and missile, the electronics and other corporations see themseves winning solid contracts for missiles, all kinds of satellites, lasers, optical reflectors etc., and see it happening now and not in the distant future. Thirdly, the corporations figure on handsome profits from commercial application of the new military space hardware.

"You cannot stop technological progress," some of our interlocutors reproached us. But the majority agreed that technological progress can and must be turned aside from the development of new weaponry; the billions involved must go to solve burning global and other problems on which the well-being of mankind hinges. And above all, we must not allow the "space games" of the imperialist military-industrial complex to push the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.

The majority of the Americans we met were deeply troubled by the continuing "stellar boom" for the Pentagon's contractors, but they also nursed radiant hopes for the success of the new Soviet-American talks opening in Geneva in March, and there was a growing conviction among them that the historic task of preventing an arms race in space can and must be achieved. Much depends here on the goodwill and realism Washington displays, on its readiness to reach a reasonable compromise and to strictly observe the principle of parity and equal security.

12258 CSO: 1807/247

WEINBERGER BRIEFS FRANCE'S HERNU ON SDI COOPERATION

PM021029 Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Mar 85 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Mr Hernu Wants European Consultation on American Space Defense Proposals"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger gave Charles Hernu, his French counterpart, a letter in Paris on Thursday 28 March in which the United States calls on France and several NATO allies plus Australia, Japan, and Israel, to take part in joint research on the different technologies which could form the basis of an ABM and antisatellite space defense system. In the afternoon, when Mr Weinberger was at Suippes camp (Marne) being shown the Integrated Network of Automatic Communications used in the Army, the French delegation continued to have technical discussions with General Abrahamson, who heads the U.S. space defense program known since March 1983 under the official name of Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.

Members of Mr Hernu's entourage think that the Americans now seem to have taken greater account of the Europeans' own security concerns, no longer portraying the SDI as a defense concept which would go beyond and replace nuclear deterrence but rather as a complement to that deterrence on which peace in Europe has been based for 40 years.

If this is now the overall outlook put forward by the United States, the same source adds, the SDI can be seen as a double challenge: a military challenge linked to a strategic ambition and directed at the Soviet Union, and a technological challenge (in other words, ultimately, a research program in key sectors which are of interest of civilian and military industrialists) made to the Europeans and their allies. This challenge, the French defense minister said, can only be taken up collectively, and this requires preliminary consultation among the Europeans and a joint definition of cooperation procedures on an equal footing with the United States in space research.

During their talks Mr Weinberger and Mr Hernu did not draw up an inventory of the techniques suited to the needs. On the other hand, it is now clear that, if the research was undertaken jointly, it would relate to such varied advanced technology sectors as data processing, new sensors, integrated circuits, large-capacity computers, high-output electronic components, and new sources of energy. This research should relate to the minaturization of systems, the reduction of their weight, the reduction of costs, and the optimization of energy yield.

The French minister planned to accompany his guest to the Plateau d'Albion in Haute-Provence on Friday 29 March, where the U.S. defense secretary is to see for the first time the 18 strategic ballistic missiles buried in silos, with their thermonuclear charges measured in megatons (50 times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb).

FRANCE'S DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON DEFENSE POLICY, SDI

LD231125 Paris Domestic Service in French 0630 GMT 22 Mar 85

[Interview with Charles Hernu, defense minister, by unidentified interviewer-live]

[Excerpts] Our guest this morning is Defense Minister Charles Hernu whose book, "Defending Peace," has just been published by Jean-Claude Lattes. Good morning, Mr Minister. You seldom appear on the radio. Is it because you are rather reticent?

[Hernu] No, but the defense minister follows to some extent the orders he gives to his own men -- that is, one must implement the nation's defense policy -- a policy which has the wide support of French women and men. Therefore, under the circumstances I do not see why I should add anything. That is why.

[Interviewer] Defending peace reminds me of the old Latin proverb: If you want peace, prepare for war. Is this true?

[Hernu] Not precisely. France is not preparing for war. France is putting itself in a position to ensure its security in all circumstances, and this security, as we see it, is derived both from the independence obtained through our nuclear deterrent — this freedom of French decision illustrated by the leadership; with the chief of the Army also being the president of the Republic — and at the same time our solidarity within the framework of the Atlantic alliance. Our defense must stay at a level such that no one gets the urge to attack France. You mention "Defending Peace" — you are right, that is the title of my book. I could also have called it "preparing the future," because on the matter of defense security the work is done in perspective, for 5, 10, and 15 years. We must be thinking of the protection systems of the end of the millenium.

[Interviewer] A modern army has two axes: the nuclear force and what one calls conventional weapons. What is the correct equilibrium between these two forces. They are complementary, but to what extent?

[Hernu] I thank you for asking me this. In my book I say that France's defense is a concept of global deterrence and that there are no strategic or prestrategic nuclear forces, on the one hand, which would group the elite of our Army, while, on the other, the conventional forces would be made up of unspecialized officers, NCO's and soldiers. They have all the same purpose: security. So they are complementary. This is what I call the theory of the three circles. The mission of our Armed Forces is to protect France and its vital interests. If the president were to decide to do so, his forces could intervene in the context of the Atlantic alliance. And third, we have six defense

agreements with African countries -- six military cooperation agreements with others. This third circle must be able to honor its promises. So this is how the French Army is organized.

Now what does this mean from the budgetary point of view? This is probably what you mean -- approximately 30 percent of the budget is devoted to the nuclear deterrent, but 70 percent -- and this is often forgotten -- goes to the so-called classical forces.

[Interviewer] Is 30 percent for the nuclear deterrent enough?

[Hernu] It is not insufficient. It is not a question of possessing, as the two big powers do, enough nuclear devices to reach a saturation point. It suffices to have the level necessary to deter any attack. The president of the Republic, the head of government and myself, we shall take great care as to this level. There is no risk in this field. Moreover, in a few days' time "The Inflexible" will be launched. This is a submarine which will be equipped with the new M4 missile, with a greater reach and higher precision and, alone, this submarine will double the entire megatonic strength of our entire nuclear submarine force. This represents an extraordinary leap forward. You know that the president of the Republic has decided that at all times there will be three nuclear submarines of this type at sea. Leaving polemics aside, this is a decision our predecessors could have taken and we took.

[Interviewer] They exist, but one does not know where. Does the minister know where they are?

[Hernu] If the minister wishes to know where they are, yes, but, you know, they are hidden away at the bottom of the sea. We, together with the general delegation for arms, are in the process of carrying out very sophisticated work which would increase the discretion, secrecy, and nondetectability of our submarines, and that is what the head of state has decided to create in a new-type, missile-launch nuclear submarine of a new generation, one on which we are already working.

[Interviewer] You say that the French Army is ready to defend France, but France is not only the Metropolitan France. One thinks in particular of the overseas departments and territories. Obviously, New Caledonia comes immediately to mind. How can one defend something which is far, far away from Metropolitan France?

[Hernu] We have military, land, and naval bases. A short time ago the "Jeanne d'Arc" stopped over in Noumea. We have military airports there, the French flag is there. You have asked a good question. If I disregard the nearly 50,000 soldiers which are in the FRG as part of the French forces in Germany, France has 35,000 soldiers outside its borders, because of our overseas departments, of course, but we also have men and women in Djibouti, we have men and women in African countries with which we have defense agreements. We must also stress the humanitarian effort made by the Army, the hundreds of military doctors who are in Africa and who play a decisive role. Even today, a chief doctor, (Lenel), is leaving for Madagascar to see about starting a vaccination mission there in May. As you know, we have a Transall aircraft which is carrying food for the hungry populations between Djibouti and Ethiopia. There is also all that the Army is doing, for example, to save the boat people. The French forces, through the Navy, have participated in the demining of the Gulf and the Suez Canal. This humanitarian role of our Army is often little understood.

[Interviewer] To go back to your book "Defending Peace," one can ask oneself whether, paradoxically, the future of the French Army lies in Europe?

[Hernu] Well, you know, first of all France is a member of the Atlantic alliance. We do not belong to the NATO integrated command. Note that although the FRG does not have right of access to nuclear deterrent it does belong to the NATO integrated command. We have privileged relations with the FRG, accomplished through president Francois Mitterrand's putting into effect Article 20 of the Elysee Treaty. There will even be joint Franco-German military exercises this year and the next. When we say that the role of our armies is to defend France and her vital interests, the vital interests can include the European circle, but only if the president so decides. This is the independence to which we are attached. Europe must progress on the road to its security but it can only do it, does only do it, and shall only do it through joint programs of arms, of construction of devices, of aircraft, and helicopters. For the moment there cannot be a European army for the good reason that an army is an arm, an instrument serving a policy, serving the civilian power. To my knowledge -- I was listening just now to the news of what is going on in Brussels -- there is no European political authority. One cannot see on whom this army would depend, therefore one must trust in this: The Atlantic alliance is the only place to be in the face of a confrontation. and France, within this context, maintains the freedom to dispose of the use of its nuclear forces.

[Interviewer] Within the framework of what has been called rather insultingly — and I know that President Reagan does not like it — "star wars", can one envisage a European space shield? I know that there are talks in Geneva on this issue but if there is a European army it is true that it is merely an arm and there is no political power behind it as you said, but is there a plan for a European space shield? What is the position of the French defense minister on this matter?

[Hernu] I do not like the expression "star wars" and I would prefer the use of the name Strategic Defense Initiative. Within the Strategic Defense Initiative one must see that the American scientists, the researchers, and the army people themselves are not certain that this shield you were talking about is capable of protecting the United States. I mean that even if it allowed 10 percent of the enemy missiles to go through, that would mean 1,000 missiles. Second, this research — because it is a case of research and study with a considerable contribution from the Americans, \$26 billion, — would not be complete, if it is to be completed, before the end of this century. Therefore, President Reagan's statement should not cause France and Europe to demobilize and convince us to miss out on the nuclear deterrent.

Contrary to what is said and written, President Reagan does not miss out on nuclear deterrent because you saw a few days ago how he himself fought each congressman in his own congress to bring about the adoption of the MX missile program. The Americans do not miss out on nuclear deterrent and France must be very careful that this so-called "star wars" does not start between the Soviet Union and the United States. This would be too dangerous an escalation, but France must participate in research and study and, in this regard, the government's vigilance is great.

CSO: 5200/2541

LE MONDE: PARIS SEEKS UNITED EUROPEAN SDI STANCE

PM221446 Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Mar 85 pp 1, 6

[Article by Jacques Amalric: "Paris Would Like To Unify European Positions With Regard to United States"]

[Text] In the past few days the British and West German Governments have distanced themselves from President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. This development is particularly significant because Mrs Thatcher, like Chancellor Kohl, had recently seemed to give unqualified support for the White House chief's "star wars" plan.

This change of line is welcomed in particular by French leaders, who will try in the next few weeks to unify the positions of the main West European countries on this issue.

The first "cracks" in the British position appeared last week when Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe expressed to a group of diplomats very serious reservations about Mr Reagan's plan, whose many uncertainties he stressed. That earned him violent criticism Wednesday 20 March from U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle at a colloquium held in London. Mr Perle accused Sir Geoffrey Howe in particular of "rewriting" the history of strategic relations between the United States and the USSR to the extent of "making it unrecognizable."

Confirmation of a change in the West German position was given Wednesday 20 March by Chancellor Kohl himself. Addressing the CDU Congress the chancellor admitted that Mr Reagan's plan might never be implemented. "The more success there is in Geneva in making drastic reductions in offensive nuclear weapons in the East and the West, the more deployment of systems in space will become superfluous," the chancellor said, in particular, referring to the American-Soviet negotiations.

"We are leaving open our decision on the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative," he added, "and we will continue to seek a joint European position and put it to our American friends." The West German Government had already expressed reservations on Mr Reagan's plan last Monday through Mr Genscher.

The doubts expressed in both London and Bonn are the result of two main considerations. The first is the fear of the American-Soviet Geneva negotiations failing if Mr Reagan sticks obstinately to his position that the SDI is "not negotiable." Such a failure would inevitably lead to a revival of the arms race, especially in space, and would render the ABM limitation agreement null and void.

The second main concern relates to the "star wars" plan, whose feasibility has still not been demonstrated by the various American officials and experts who nonetheless have the job of convincing the Europeans that it is feasible.

It was France which first cast doubt on this program. The president of the Republic's entourage points out that the plan, as presented by President Reagan, has a "mythical dimension" which has its roots in the old U.S. isolationist tendencies and in the Americans' refusal to accept that their territory might be threatened with nuclear reprisals.

On the other hand, there is no indication that in 20 or 25 years' time it will be possible to install a totally heremetic "shield" in space. This last point is not denied by any American expert, and most of the political officials in Washington, although they have rallied round to the Reagan plan, admit that the U.S. President is virtually the only person who has complete faith in his program. Moreover, it is a program which would have to be developed over five or six presidential terms....

The disadvantages of the SDI which are particularly stressed in Paris fall into three categories:

- 1. By developing space defense the United States will prompt the USSR to do likewise, and this will have harmful consequences for the credibility of the French strike force, whose missiles will come up against new obstacles.
- 2. By his messianic statements on star wars, Mr Reagan may produce a demobilization phenomenon by making the public, which is very naturally distrustful of nuclear weapons, believe that there is an alternative to deterrence. The fact that the United States is continuing to devote vast sums to strengthening its nuclear panoply does not reduce this risk in any way.
- 3. In any case the SDI presents Europe with a technological challenge. Paris does not believe in the sincerity of Washington's offers of cooperation which are in any case extremely vague. These offers, Paris adds, are aimed primarily at "paralyzing critical consideration of the SDI" and at undermining European inititiatives in this sphere. In this connection, Paris recalls that the United States has never favorably viewed European cooperation in high-technology sectors, and the Airbus and Ariane project are cited as examples.

A Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting?

Paris' efforts in the next few weeks will be aimed therefore at strengthening the doubts of London and Bonn and making them abandon the "crumbs" of cooperation with the United States for the sake of a new European venture. The Elysee admits that there is no indication that these efforts will be crowned with success, but it is thought that they deserve to be tried, if only so that the Europeans have a joint position when they are faced with Mr Reagan at the industrialized countries' summit in the FRG in May.

According to those who drew it up, the French position must not be seen as a tactical rapprochement with Moscow, and it is definitely not intended to freeze the research phase in the "star wars" sphere. It is, they say, dictated solely by the country's vital interest. In these circumstances, moreover, it is surprising that the president of the Republic has not yet seen fit to discuss this crucial subject with the main

opposition leaders, if only to maintain the "consensus on defense" which is often pointed to in high places.

These major European maneuvers come at a time when several sources say they are convinced of the imminence of a Reagan-Gorbachev summit. In NATO circles in Brussels it is even being said that such a meeting might be held in Helsinki. These reports have so far not drawn any comment from Moscow. The TASS agency, on the other hand, devoted a harsh commentary on Wednesday to Mr Reagan's speech to the Senate supporting the MX strategic missile program, accusing the U.S. President of "hypocrisy, demagoguery, and militarist ambition." At the same time it was learned in Washington that U.S. Secretary of Commerce Baldridge will visit Moscow on 20 and 21 May to try to normalize American-Soviet trade. To prevent these talks from failing the two sides have decided not to discuss the problem of militarily sensitive high technology on which the United States has placed an embargo.

CSO: 5200/2541

WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO SDI EXAMINED

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Vladlen Kuznetsow: "A Time to Choose"]

[Text] How, in what way can the elimination of nuclear weapons be achieved? There is the radical solution - draw up an agreement to abolish nuclear arms under strict international control. The Soviet Union was the first to come up with such a proposal, but the other nuclear powers are not as yet prepared for such a resolute step. So there remains another approach to the solution of the problem - the gradual, phased approach, the method of partial measures. Such as a freeze on nuclear arsenals in both quantitative and qualitative terms; a commitment by all nuclear powers not to be the first to use the most deadly and destructive weapon imaginable (the Soviet Union has already done so); adoption, as proposed by the Soviet Union, of a peaceful code of behavior for the nuclear powers regulating their relations with each other and with the outside world; a complete and universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests; agreements on the limitation and reduction of various types of nuclear weaponry.

But lo, there has come out of Washington a plan touted as a much more effective and direct path to the elimination of nuclear arms. To achieve this goal, it argues, you must first create a large-scale, partially space-based defense system. An absolute, impregnable shield will so devalue offensive weapons that the only alternative left to the nuclear powers will be to scrap them. After all, what do you need a sword for if it is bound to disintegrate on coming into contact with the miracle shield? To hear admirers of the "president's initiative", which even in America itself has been unequivocally christened "Star Wars", tell it, they ought to be given the Nobel Peace Prize. But, one may well ask, what for?

Because they have no intention of "devaluing" their offensive capability, but, on the contrary, are applying even greater vigor to honing their strategic sword?

Because in the next few years the arms race on earth and in space will become even more wasteful, meaningless, absurd and, of course, much more dangerous than today?

Because the cosmic caper could complicate or, in a worst-case scenario, even torpedo the Soviet-American talks slated to begin in Geneva on March 12?

You can't prove the unprovable, yet Washington is trying to pass Star Wars off as a "humane" project, well-nigh a cure-all against all the evils and woes that threaten to rain down on mankind. And as a shield that would protect not only America, but the whole of Western Europe against a "Soviet attack". The capitals of the NATO countries are currently hosting a string of top-ranking US emissaries bent on crushing the open or behind-the-scenes resistance of their very worried allies to the planned militarization of space. Some are beginning to give in to the brainwashing, but Washington wants more. It wants its project to be approved by all of Western Europe.

Why has the US administration committed all its forces to the propaganda front? Above all, because it wants NATO to share some of the responsibility for an undertaking fraught with serious consequences for world peace, to make it the bloc's common platform, to emblazon, so to speak, the cosmic shield with the Atlantic emblem - a wind rose. And thereby to bolster its rather shaky position on space weaponry at the upcoming Geneva talks. Washington aims to utilize the scientific and industrial potential of its Western European partners (and, naturally, Japan), to skim the cream off their technology and, if possible, attract their investments. In the overall scheme of things the US figures on tying its allies tighter to its global nuclear strategy, a strategy that evokes concern among the peace-loving community and now and then gives goose bumps to even the most loyal nephews of bellicose Uncle Sam.

What is the reaction to all this in Western Europe and NATO? Among broad public and political circles the White House venture evokes a great deal of apprehension. Over the fate of Soviet-American negotiations and the entire process of arms limitation and reduction. Over the fate of world peace and stability, and of our planet in general were it to be threatened by the ominous tandem of terrestrial and space weaponry. These circles are not taking at face value statements by Washington apostles of Star Wars to the effect that, so be it, they will cover Western Europe with the allegedly hermetic "cosmic shield" if the Old World should be fired by the same attachment to it as the chief of the White House. Nor do they believe Washington's soothing assurances that deployment of the space systems is "still a long way off" and the whole affair may be limited to "pure research work".

But there are forces in Western Europe who are banking, for a variety of selfish reasons, on the USA's military supremacy over the USSR. These forces are willing to ride the rear end of the American war chariot and cast prudence to the winds as long as they are not accused by Washington of antiamericanism and a diminishing interest in Atlantic solidarity. There is, too, a desire on their part not to fall behind the senior partner in military and technological

terms, whereas the military-industrial complexes of Western Europe (including those represented in government) are not averse to getting some fat orders from the Pentagon for space hardware. The US cleverly uses these aspirations, as well as its own commanding position in NATO, to foist the president's "strategic defense" initiative on the entire bloc.

One result is that the ruling circles of West Germany, who until recently would not dream of publicly enthusing over the White House's space odyssey, have done a complete turnaround. They are now hitching themselves to Reagan's program and assuming the role of its advocates to boot by trying to talk others into taking the same course. Such was the drift of chancellor H.Kohl's speech at a recent conference in Munich organized by the "Wehrkunde" military-science association. The GENERALANZEIGER noted that Kohl had, in effect, come to head "the weak European lobby of supporters of the American strategic "defense initiative". One such lobbyist is Belgian prime minister W.Martens who holds, in contrast to public opinion in his own country, that Western Europe will "find itself defenseless" if it does not lend support to the aforesaid initiative.

It is true that the Western European lobby is as yet not of the caliber the White House would like, but Washington is doing its best to remedy that by pressuring the NATO allies collectively and one on one. In the meantime, enter the mercenary interests of the West German corporations. There are reports from Bonn that the Federal Defense Ministry has already contracted the leading arms manufacturers of the republic to ascertain their "possible participation in the creation of a space-based defense system". From London, where the ruling circles were only recently expressing reservations about the Star Wars program of the US president, one now hears statements to the effect that the government will not impede "the struggle of British companies for contracts" should any be offered by Washington.

In the meantime, deep concern over the dangers inherent in the militarization of space is being voiced by the ruling circles of France, Italy and other countries. "The Italian government", stated foreign minister G.Andreotti, "is of the opinion that in the overall plan the Geneva talks must be aimed at preventing the uncontrolled and competitive militarization of space which would lead to very serious destabilizing consequences". The French minister of national defense Ch.Hernu thinks that the Star Wars project carries the threat of an accelerated arms race and further expansion of offensive systems.

Which approach will gain the upper hand in the leading Western European members of NATO - the sober, realistic one which rejects adventurism in space or the pro-American - only the future can tell. For the now, though, in the words of J.Wilson of the WASHING-TON POST, Washington is doing all it can "to sell the mysterious product to the skeptical Europeans". Wilson notes sardonically

that in the course of his Western European trip Pentagon chief C.Weinberger failed to come up with a coherent explanation of when the "strategic defense initiative" would be implemented, how much it would cost and whether it would work at all.

In a word, a cosmic "cat in the bag". One thing about it, though, is clear: it has aggressive claws, no matter how strenuous the effort to pull them in. And the selling of the cat is being done with a truly Nozdrev unceremoniousness.

Not everybody yet recognizes the true nature of Washington's plans and intentions concerning space. Not everybody clearly realizes that implementation of these ambitions can lead to the further undermining of international security and strategic stability.

But the time has come to make a choice. A choice between easing military confrontation or aggravating it. Tertium non datur. It is a choice whereon hinges the present and the future of a continent that survived two world wars but will not survive a third, nuclear one.

The Soviet position is clear as clear can be: space must be free of any weaponry whatsoever. No space strike systems of whatever design or whatever basing mode should be created, tested or deployed, neither for use in the cosmos nor from the cosmos against targets on the ground, in the air or on the seas. All such systems already in existence must be destroyed. Touching on the subject of the upcoming Soviet-American talks in a speech at an election rally, comrade K.U.Chernenko stressed that "agreement is absolutely necessary and quite possible. It is necessary because otherwise the world will roll faster and faster down the incline of the arms race and the threat of war will continue to grow".

In the postwar years Washington has thrown the gauntlet at the Soviet Union more than once. And each time got the response it deserved. Is there any need, then, for yet another test? The USSR has sufficient material and technical capabilities, technological potential and intellectual resources to stand up to Washington's space challenge.

It is better not to initiate an arms race in a sphere where none yet exists. Better to drop the uncertain and risky ventures that promise nothing but more failures and to steer a course toward genuine, de facto disarmament, toward universal and complete disarmament.

12258 CSO: 1807/247

SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO URGES 'COLLECTIVE' RESPONSE TO SDI

AU101458 Paris AFP in English 1451 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] Paris, April 10 (AFP) -- Lord Carrington, the secretary-general of NATO, said today that the U.S. space-defense plan was vitally important to European defense and urged a "collective European response" to Washington's offer that allies take part in the multi-billion dollar research project.

"The Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], for better or worse, is of vital importance to the defense of Europe," he said, using the formal name for a program colloquially known as "star wars."

"I passionately believe that Europe needs to be, and needs to be seen to be, more energetic in its own defense," he said. "If we are serious about a European defense identity, we should surely make every effort to make a collective European response to the invitation which has been put to us," he said in reference to the U.S. Administration's proposal last month that 18 allied nations join in the controversial research project.

The program has raised some concern in Europe, including the fear that it could undercut traditional Western deterrent strategy.

But Washington has been pressing for a joint statement of support in view of Soviet opposition to the project, which is part of the subject matter of the new U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva.

Lord Carrington, speaking at the French Institute of International Relations, said he saw progress in arms production and acquisition as a key element in creating a more forceful European defense identity.

One specific proposal he put forth was the creation of jointly funded European research establishments on such items as armored fighting vehicles.

Citing the example of the European Space Agency, Lord Carrington stressed the importance of what he called institutionalized cooperation on basic research for Europe.

But he emphasized that defense research in the United States and the Soviet Union has three times greater financial backing in Europe.

Lord Carrington, who is a former British foreign secretary, concluded by urging greater practical cooperation among member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Economic Community and other allied organizations where defense questions are tackled.

It is up to these governments, he said, "to ensure that they work together to the extent necessary."

"The aim," he said, "is to strengthen the Atlantic alliance as well as the European contribution to it."

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UK'S THATCHER DISCUSSES GORBACHEV, SDI

BKO21341 Singapore THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 31 Mar 85 p 19

["Exclusive interview" granted by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to correspondent John Drysdale in London on Thatcher's upcoming Southeast Asian tour; date not given]

[Excerpts] Q: Might I ask you what you meant when you said after your first meeting with Mr Gorbachev that he was a man with whom one could do business?

A: Exactly what I said. It is very strange -- you come up with pretty straight statements and people say: "What in the world do you mean?" I wish they would ask economists when they come out with statements full of jargon!

Mr Gorbachev has always lived his life under Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet model. I know what it means. You know what it means for an economy at home and an economy abroad. I have always lived my life in a free society. We defend it anywhere in the world. It is quite the best way of life and it must be defended. Each of us knows that neither is ever going to convert the other, so there is no point in wasting time on arguing about that system or this system. But each of us knows that it is to the interest of the people who live under the Soviet system and in the interest of the people in the Western alliance, and in the interests of the non-aligned countries who have yet to determine their own particular way of life and how it shall develop, that there should be no conflict between East and West.

And therefore it is in our interest to negotiate, and it is also in our interest to have security at a lower level of weaponry and of a lower level of expense. Now I often think you can do business with someone else when you make a pretty straightforward assessment of their system and your own -- we both do that, no rose-tinted spectacles.

Mr Gorbachev believes totally in the Marxist-Leninist system and will continue to do so. It is, I believe, the most rigid system in the world, and that I can't do anything about, so one makes one's assessment of that.

I can negotiate with him. I think it is in our interest if we are to get the armaments agreements that we wish to have that they come out and see more of us and that we have more contact with them. I think you get further with negotiations if you have a better understanding both of the people and of the system, and of how they think about us, and they understand how we think about them.

The Politburo has been a collective group for a very long time, but I think Mr Gorbachev will be there, obviously by reason of age, a long time -- he is very able and I have not the slighest shadow of doubt that he and the Politburo will be able to fashion their way forward.

Q: Given that the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative is a response to Soviet SDI research, does the U.S. Government fully accept the British Government's view that the deployment of space weapons is juridically a matter for negotiation?

A: The president said so within Camp David in the four points to which he agreed, and when I was there in a press conference at the end of our talks he said so again. The anti-ballistic treaty, as you know, was signed by both the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Research is not contrary to that treaty in any way — totally permitted by it — for very obvious reasons: There is no way of verifying how much research is going on on the other side.

There are certain weapons that can be developed under that treaty but they are fairly restrictive; certain radar developments that can takes place, but again they are specified by the treaty. Once you get beyond that into deployment, and in some cases into deployment, and in some cases into testing, it is a matter for negotiation. The United States is a signatory to that treaty. Obviously she will honour it.

Q: Are you happy about the decision in the United States about the production of 21 MX missiles? Do you think this might have an adverse effect on the Geneva talks?

A: No, I do not. You might say the same about cruise missiles here.

But, you know the firmness of Western countries in deploying cruise missiles and the lesson to the Soviet Union that they could not use propaganda in a free society to cloud people's view of the nature of the Soviet system, must be a lesson which perhaps surprised them -- the lesson was they could not influence Western public opinion, and the lesson was that we were firm.

We did what we said we would do. That, added to the fact that they obviously —by Mr Gromyko's visit to the United States — took the view that the President was going to be there for another term: I think that brought them back to the negotiating table.

cso: 5200/2573

FRG EDITORIAL DEMANDS OPPOSITION TO U.S. SDI PLANS

DW021215 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 2 Apr 85 p 3

[Editorial by Ulrich Mackensen: "Risk the Conflict"]

[Text] The public discussion about the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) of President Ronald Reagan is limited in the FRG to mainly two questions. First: Will the Europeans take part in research work for the "star wars program" in order not to become technologically dependent on the United States? Second: What effects could SDI have on relations between Washington and its West European allies?

High-ranking Defense and Foreign Ministry officials wonder about the strategic and political consequences of a missile defense system in space; however, in contrast to other Western democracies, their reservations are not being openly discussed. Exaggerated loyalty to the alliance is probably the reason, and fear that critical remarks could be considered "anti-American." The only exception is Foreign Minister Genscher; however, his vague statements hardly reflect courage either. Clear reservations, such as uttered by French Defense Minister Charles Hernu at the Munich military science meeting, or a sharp-witted analysis, as voiced a few days ago by British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe in London, have so far not been heard in Bonn.

The SDI program will determine the direction of developments for a long time. Dangers are lurking behind the harmless name "Strategic Defense Initiative" -- as demonstrated by the word "star wars," which Washington uses itself for the alleged defense concept. The relative security achieved through mutual nuclear deterrence would be abandoned for a system that could rather lead to war because it grossly neglects the elementary security needs of the other side.

The basic problem is poorly described by the slogan "Militarization of space." It became a fact long ago: Soviet killer satellites circle the earth; militarily used U.S. space shuttles leave our planet and return again; and espionage satellites collect information.

SDI, however, is of another caliber. It is supposed to lead to the deployment of non-nuclear defense weapons in space, whose energy sources could also be small nuclear power plants, and which could destroy approaching intercontinental missiles with a laser, for example. These plans are based on a gravely wrong assessment, which could give rise to serious doubts about the leadership role of the United States in NATO.

These plans are based on the simple facts of arms history. Both powers have managed to take the lead in the development of new weapon systems for only a few years. An

example of this is missiles with multiple warheads (MIRV). The Soviets caught up much faster than Washington expected. Something similar is likely to happen in connection with SDI. Reports are being already circulated, according to which Moscow is also developing non-nuclear space defense systems.

The U.S. lead of a few years (maybe 5-7 years), however, makes another Soviet reaction also possible. Moscow could increase its production of nuclear weapons, because in this way the Kremlin could have something in hand against SDI. Before the Soviets will yield to U.S. superiority, irrational reactions cannot be ruled out. A war reaching into space out of fear of becoming encircled is at least imaginable. Washington has violated the basic rule of every strategic consideration, namely to first try to see the situation of the adversary before making its own decision.

Almost absurd, however, is the argument that SDI research would be stopped in order to incorporate it in arms control negotiations. The dynamics of the "star wars" program with the underlying strong economic interests would be already so strong that it would probably also escape seriously meant political control.

Therefore, the Europeans must not support Reagan's plans. NATO must try to stop them. Otherwise, the alliance would inevitably have to face the consequences of an arms race in space, of costs that will have an effect on other fields, or the greater danger of war, and or decreasing credibility of every defensive effort. Europeans must risk a conflict with the United States before uncontrolled arms technologies score a final victory over political control and human reason.

cso: 5200/2572

FRG PAPERS VIEW BONN'S REACTION TO WEINBERGER LETTER

DW281419 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 28 Mar 85

[From the press review]

[Text] Editorials today deal with Bonn's stance on the U.S. SDI and in particular Defense Secretary Weinberger's letter on this problem, which was received in the FRG capital on Tuesday evening. Also commented upon are the information that a U.S. delega-of SDI experts gave them Bundestag committees, and the Federal Government's statement published yesterday on Washington's plans.

The Koblenz RHEIN-ZEITUNG writes: Neither the letter by U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, nor the unusual information by U.S. SDI expert Abrahamson have induced Bonn to give up its cautious attitude toward the SDI research program. On the contrary, before Abrahamson even finished, the Federal Government, by publishing a statement of its Security Council -- which is an unusual step -- had already established its position which, though friendly on principle, is full of conditions. Bonn obviously is marking time, so as to allow a united response by the European NATO partners to Reagan's plans. This seems to be realistic in view of the forthcoming EC summit and U.S. president Reagan's visit to Europe in May.

Freiburg's BADISCHE ZEITUNG comments as follows: Asked by the Americans to commit themselves to either acceptance or rejection of the SDI, the Federal Republic on Tuesday gave two different answers. Defense Minister Woerner said the SDI research was extremely reasonable and by no means controversial. More important, in Bonn the Federal Security Council considers the U.S. plans to be justified, but by no means good enough to allow approval with the haste desired by Washington. The Federal Government's statement is nothing but a list of Bonn's reservations cloaked in lengthy pledges of loyalty. Concern is being expressed there about an undermining of the present NATO defense strategy. In addition, the danger of a separation of West Europe and the United States and the danger of an offensive nuclear weapons buildup are being mentioned. Finally, Bonn's efforts to reach a united stance with the other Europeans is being pointed out in an almost embarrassed way since many of the Europeans hold a critical stance on Reagan's SDI. All this betrays tactical pains. Once again, the Federal Government is facing the difficult task of making European and transatlantic obligations meet.

We read in LUEBECKER NACHRICHTEN: The British and French have always had misgivings that their own nuclear weapons could eventually become militarily and politically useless, whereas Helmut Kohl quickly advocated German participation in the U.S. research work. However, at the Essen CDU congress last week, he adopted Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's reserved course. It was decisive for the alliance's strategy of flexible response to remain untouched and for a military buildup in space to be prevented, he said. This also was stated in Bonn on Wednesday. At the Brussels EC summit next weekend, Kohl will discuss with his NATO partners a united response to Ronald Reagan's SDI.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG comments on Weinberger's letter as follows: The letter the defense secretary wrote to the NATO allies, as well as some other governments with which the United States maintains friendly relations, asking them to consider economic, scientific, and other potentials regarding their usefulness for SDI would have required a psychological updating. Setting a deadline of 60 days for consideration is an unusual method of dealing with one's allies. The Federal Government's statement on SDI reflects the doubts some of its members have had recently about it. Bonn is trying to keep the options open and gain time, while occasionally even pretending not to have understood Weinberger's letter.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE notes: In Bonn's view, another aspect is of importance. Even though the defense secretary's letter stresses the U.S. intention to strengthen deterrence, guarantee its partners' security, and meet all international obligations, it falls short of those criteria that the Federal Government announced as early as on 13 February as a gauge for its own reaction to a U.S. cooperation offer. The letter does not mention the renunciation of superiority, nor does Washington commit itself to cooperation with Moscow in the development of a missile defense system.

BRAUNSCHWEIGER ZEITUNG writes: With its cautious statement on the U.S. offer regarding participation in SDI, the Federal Government has taken a proper stance. The time, the required financial funds and the rate at which the planned space defense system will be installed is not even known at present in the United States. Therefore, the demand by our opposition parties to turn the Americans down is just foolish and rash, because after implementation, this project will possibly make nuclear armament the greatest burden of our century, superfluous because a huge defense shield protects the land and people, and will have a strong effect. The United States will try to get this shield, with or without European consent. Setting up a European defense system is an illusion because of the Europeans' political differences. Leaving the option of participation open and maintaining a reserved attitude is at present the politically correct behavior.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU notes that the Federal Chancellor has so far always reacted somewhat helplessly to the U.S. announcements on SDI, referring to the offer that he was expecting. The paper adds: Now the offer has come. How, it is not an offer but a demand with a 60-day deadline. What is Bonn supposed to offer the Americans? A specially well-focused viewfinder? Is the Federal Republic supposed to build a laser cannon? Whatever we do, we would be collaborating in a project whose political effect must be described as controversial at best. Thus it is no wonder that the reaction Bonn showed on Wednesday is clearly reserved. They leave their options open.

FRG REACTION TO U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

SPD Calls for Rejection

LD261159 Hamburg DPA in German 1024 GMT 26 Feb 85

[Text] Bonn, 26 Feb (DPA) — The SPD has called on the Federal Government to firmly reject U.S. plans for the development of a strategic defense system in space. Following other leadership bodies, the SPD Presidium also passed a statement at its most recent session in which the conservative-liberal Federal Government is called upon to "unambiguously reject any participation in the space armament plans of the Reagan government." In a resolution published today in Bonn, the SPD Presidium said that it was "high time" that the European allies of the United States, "without glossing over things, publicly articulate" their concerns about the concept described as "star wars." In view of the dangerous threat, Europe is called upon to "make its interests heard in a sustained way in these matters of life and death, if European self-assertion is not to give way to submission."

A competition among the Western Europeans for participation in the "star wars program" in the hope of technological involvement would be, in the SPD view, "politically grotesque." Referring to the fact that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl signaled his approval for the project under certain conditions, the SPD Presidium maintains that it is an illusion to assume that the West Europeans could participate in the technological research without having to jointly bear the military responsibility, the consequences, and the burdens. It adds that the U.S. program would destabilize the military balance between the East and West, open up a new arms race, and could destroy the strategic unity of the Western alliance. In this way Europe could become a zone of reduced security and thus a hostage of the superpowers. In a press conference today in Bonn, Deputy Chairman of the SPD and leader of the opposition in the Bundestag Hans-Jochen Vogel criticized the fact that Chancellor Kohl was "overly hasty" and had "prematurely" conveyed the impression that the Federal Republic was ready to cooperate in the U.S. plans. Alluding to the strong French reservations, Vogel expressed the hope that the next talk of the chancellor with the French Government in Paris would lead to corrections.

Editorial Expresses Doubts

DW221233 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 22 Feb 85 p 3

[Editorial by Hans-Herbert Gaebel: "Grabbing for the Stars"]

[Text] "We need all the help we can get," said U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Scientists from allied and friendly countries should participate in the research program of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI].

Of course, President Reagan and his followers, who are obviously determined to promote the search for absolute invulnerability with all means, need every bit of technological and financial help they can get.

Help is being offered even before it is known how the greatest research project of all times should work in detail. Undreamed-of possibilities seem to be opening up for the allies of the United States. "Star wars," as the Strategic Defense Initiative is frequently called publicly, will be the father of all future industries. The Bonn government wants to join in from the very beginning. We must not be detached from this technical development, it says. Minister President Spaeth of Baden-Wuerttemberg says: "Those who do not want to cooperate now, must not ask in 5 years where out jobs have gone." Jobs--a magic word in view of the number of our unemployed, which obviously makes all technical, military, and also moral reservations shrink.

In view of so much future, maybe a glance back into the past should be made? We Europeans have some experience with regard to cooperation in the military field with our leading power.

The super-research program of the U.S. Government is also a super-billion deal; this means hard competition. Weinberger just complained in his report to the U.S. Congress, among other things, about the fact that the alliance has difficulties distinguishing between friendly and enemy aircraft on the radar screen in an emergency. However, that is not a technical problem but a business problem. The West German Siemens Company is offering an apparently most effective system; but the United States wants to implement its own system. This is understandable in view of the fact that it would cost DM6 billion, but it is also an example of how wonderful theories are being rolled over by less wonderful practice. The so-called weapon-technological cooperation between the United States and its European allies is almost a one-way street anyway with a seven to one ratio in favor of the superpower.

However, an almost equally big obstacle for cooperation worthy of that name is the U.S. Government practice of completely withholding information from the allies or to issue strict conditions for them. For the Reagan administration almost all Europeans are not reliable enough; there are too many holes to the East, it maintains.

Washington has tried repeatedly to force its concepts on the Europeans, which went even so far that U.S. legal norms were simply exported to Europe, and that European firms were handled and punished as if they were American firms. The U.S. trade department has been in the field of modern high technology for a long time something like a Pentagon subdivision that checks trade relations and scientific cooperation first of all with a view to whether the Soviets could achieve military know-how that way.

The limit has been drawn respectively close, extremely close. Even if it is correct that the Soviets use the world market unscrupulously, this does not make the growing tutelage more tolerable. An example in this respect is the delivery of a U.S. weather computer for the Max-Planck Institute in Hamburg. It has been delayed for months because the security check of the employees was supposed to go far beyond the usual in such cases in our country.

This irritation was eliminated. Much more trouble would come from close cooperation on SDI research. The United States would insist on even more rigid conditions and controls. High-ranking "star wars" propagandists, who are touring Europe these days, make no secret of it at all. That would be a very high price for not being "detached." If this research program really could speed up our industrial-technical development, high technology would be locked into a cage for which we would not even have the main keys. Lothar Spaeth said with regard to SDI research that we should emphasize the technological and not the military aspect. You can only say in this connection: keep emphasizing.

FRG'S SPAETH ON USSR VISIT, FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS, SDI

Moscow Conference

LD271859 Hamburg DPA in German 1808 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow, 27 Mar (DPA) -- Lothar Spaeth (CDU), acting president of the Bundesrat and Baden-Woerttemberg minister president, spoke at the end of his political talks in Moscow in favor of a more intensified dialogue between representatives of the ruling parties in Bonn and the Soviet Union. In the CDU there is no tradition of the kind known in the SPD: This, however, could be improved, Spaeth said today at a Moscow press conference.

Spaeth exchanged views with Vitaliy Vorotnikov, premier of the RSFSR and Politburo member, lasting about 1 and 1/2 hours. Earlier he held talks with Vladimir Promyslov, the mayor of Moscow. In his meetings with Soviet politicians he gained the impression that the USSR is "quite seriously" interested in progress at the Geneva arms control negotiations, Spaeth said.

Now that Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet Party chief, has taken over, one should "not" succumb to "euphoria," Spaeth said. The Soviet Union follows a continuous policy, which places issues of security in the forefront. In relations between Moscow and Bonn he discovered "no signs for a change in the climate within a short period of time."

Later today Spaeth will fly to Kiev, where he will meet with Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the Ukranian Party chief and Politburo member.

Returns, Comments on Visit

LD291831 Hamburg DPA in German 1632 GMT 29 Mar 85

[Excerpt] Stuttgart, 29 Mar (DPA) -- Lothar Spaeth, Bundesrat president and minister president of Baden-Wuerttemberg, returned to Stuttgart on Friday after a 1-week visit to the USSR. Speaking to journalists, Spaeth described his talks with Soviet politicians as "important, constructive and businesslike." His visit contributed "a fair amount" to improving the climate between East and West.

Spaeth warned against the idea that "pragmatism" will enter into the Soviet Union's policy with the change at the top of the CPSU with Mikhail Gorbachev as the new general secretary. This is an "illusory" assessment.

Advises Increased USSR Contacts

LD310917 Hamburg DPA in German 0501 GMT 31 Mar 85

[Text] Baden-Baden, 31 Mar (DPA)—The Baden-Wuerttemberg minister president Lothar Spaeth is advising his party to increase and improve contacts between leading CDU/CSU politicians and the Soviet Union.

In an interview on Southwest Radio, Spaeth stressed that apart from contacts at government level, personal contacts are necessary, particularly since the Soviet leadership is firmly reckoning on the CDU/CSU remaining the leading Bonn government party for some time.

For traditional reasons, but also as a result of the Brandt Ostpolitik, the SPD has the stronger links with Moscow, Spaeth said. These relations are useful and the CDU/CSU must therefore catch up in this area. During his talks in the Soviet Union there was also thorough discussion of those points in German-Soviet relations in which there is no agreement. Spaeth confirmed that the Soviet leadership sees a connection between economic relations and security policy. He has countered this link by pointing out that technological cooperation cannot be made dependent on the daily up and downs of political fluctations or even on the state of the Geneva negotiations.

Calls for 'Clear Stance' on SDI

LD302018 Hamburg Domestic Service in German 1800 GMT 30 Mar 85

[Text] The Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister President Spaeth demanded a clear stance from the Federal Government on American research into the SDI. This should come about from a dialogue with European neighbors, Spaeth said today after his return from a visit to the Soviet Union on Rias radio. This stance toward U.S. President Reagan's SDI is of great importance to the technological development of Europe. Spaeth added that while the Europeans discuss wine quotas and olive oil, the United States and Japan are developing their lead in the military research sector. There is a danger that Europe is being left behind.

Further Remarks

DW011345 Baden Baden Suedwestfunk Network in German 1145 GMT 31 Mar 85

[Interview with Lother Spaeth, minister president of Baden-Wuerttemberg, by correspondent Locher in the "Interview Zum Zeitgeschehen" program; date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Locher] You were treated with special attention in the Soviet Union. I know from talks with Soviet diplomats that in Moscow you are more esteemed than the chancellor. Could we conclude from this that one wants to use you as some sort of a spearhead against Kohl in German domestic policy?

[Spaeth] No, I do not think so. Moreover, it would be senseless if somebody tried to do that. I believe that in the Soviet Union one realistically sees that the CDU will probably hold the political leadership for a longer period in the FRG together

with coalition partners, and that it is sensible to deal with the CDU leadership. I believe that one has accepted it that I have very realistic standpoints with regard to many questions, that I like pragmatic action, and that one can frankly and clearly discuss matters with me. We have done so very thoroughly in matters on which we agreed, and also even more thoroughly when we did not agree at all.

[Locher] There is a point where one does not agree at all, namely the missile problem, and there is also the problem of participation in the U.S. SDI.

[Spaeth] I am not under the impression that the Soviet Union -- without fully separating these things from each other -- will endanger economic relations [with the FRG] through detailed demands regarding our attitude to the U.S. SDI.

[Locher] In the coming months you want to deal especially with European research policy. Where do you want to begin?

[Spaeth] What is most clearly demonstrated in the whole discussion about SDI — aside from the question of what is useful for research results — is the fact that we are facing a challenge of the Americans with their enormous investment in the development of new products, procedures, technologies, such as computer technology and laser technology, and the development of new materials that can be also used in space. That must make us nervous. If the Europeans should lag behind in this sector, we must begin to discuss the unemployment problem of the nineties. It becomes more and more clear that the countries of West — Europe cannot solve this problem alone by themselves. We need stronger coordination, of research capacities of the West European countries. I believe that the beginning we have made with France in some fields will be helpful.

I think that the Europeans should realize that behind the Japanese and now also the American challenge there is basically more, namely a challenge to Europe as to whether it still wants to belong tomorrow to the group of top countries with regard to modern industry, technology, and science.

cso: 5200/2548

FRG'S KOHL DISCUSSES SDI, GERMAN UNITY ISSUES

PM251515 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 22 Feb 85 p 3

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by Vanna Vannuccini in Bonn; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Vannuccini] Mr Chancellor, last week you gave two important speeches—first, to the Bundesrat about Europe, and second, to the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich about security policy. Let us start with the latter. Why did you decide to announce the German decision to participate in the U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI), better known as "star wars," thus anticipating what should, in a way, have been a European decision?

[Kohl] You are wrong to think that my announcement anticipated a European decision. What is at stake now — as I said in Munich — is the issue of participation in the U.S. space research program. For such participation there are specific preconditions, which I listed. We cannot now say what the results of this research will be or whether it will be necessary to make a final decision on an actual ABM defense system.

[Vannuccini] France and Britain have expressed reservations about the U.S. SDI. Italy is not convinced either. Mr Chancellor, do you believe that Europe will follow Germany along this path, or is it in any case more important to you to give precedence to cooperation with the United States, even if this could cause a split among the Europeans?

[KOHL] During her visit to Washington Mr Thatcher said exactly what I said. None of us says simply "yes" to the U.S. plans as far as they are understood now. We must wait to see what results the research program yields.

One thing is clear: There must be no weakening of the alliance and no European "disengagement" from the United States. We, too, are opposed to any kind of policy of unilateral superiority, on whatever side. It seems to me that we should now be talking less about where and how Europe's ideas differ from those of the United States; we should rather reflect on how -- partly in relation to the SDI project -- we can achieve reasonable cooperation that will serve our interests and those of all the allies.

[Vannuccini] One of Europe's interests is to have access to the new technologies that space weaponry will develop. But Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger argues that this is not to be discussed. What guarantees have you secured or do you expect to secure from the United States?

[Kohl] For the present there is no official U.S. offer of European cooperation in the research program that the United States has planned, and that will last 5 years. If there is European participation, then unquestionably there will have to be a transfer of technologies, regardless of what either side may be saying now.

[Vannuccini] The Soviet Union now assess states and governments on the basis of their stand on "star wars." Mr Chancellor, with your attitude to the U.S. space projects, are you not risking placing new obstacles in the way of German Ostpolitik, which recently has already encountered some difficulties?

[Kohl] There are no plans for "star wars." Those who use this term are misusing Hollywood-style science fiction for political propaganda purposes. It is entirely reasonable to investigate whether there are possibilities of nonnuclear defense against nuclear missile attack. We all hope for a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons and would be very pleased if some day it were possible to eliminate them completely. For now and the near future, peace within freedom will remain based on the strategy of nuclear deterrence. What is now being discussed as "star wars" could some day ensure world peace, if it works technically. The fact remains, however, that, rather than any kind of weapon against other weapons, I would prefer the abolition of all nuclear weapons and effective control. The objective of my security policy is to guarantee peace with fewer and fewer weapons.

[Vannuccini] It was taken for granted that East German leader Erich Honecker's first visit to the West would have been to the FRG. Now, however, Honecker is due to visit Italy in April. Does this not prompt some unease in the FRG, especially since the visit will take place before 8 May -- the anniversary of the Nazi defeat, a date when all East Europe's criticisms will center on German "revanchism?"

[Kohl] Our policy toward the Eastern bloc and toward the other German state is based on the conviction that only dialogue and cooperation will bring us nearer to the objective of an order of European peace and to transcending the unnatural division of Germany and of Europe. It is within this context that we view the SED secretary general's visit to Italy. There is no reason for any unease. Everyone knows that my invitation for Secretary General Honecker to visit the FRG still stands. Nor do I see why the fact that Honecker is to visit Rome shortly before the 40th anniversary of Germany's surrender should worry us. The GDR cannot silently evade Germany's history, either. The campaign over revanchism stirred up in the Eastern bloc is obvious. Anyone who comes to our country can see immediately that the charges leveled at us have no basis in fact. What are decisive — both for the present and for the future — are not the controversial opinions expressed by individuals but the undeniable will of the people and their government to live in peace and freedom, reconciled with all our neighbors both in the West and in the East.

[Vannuccini] The GDR is trying to score propaganda points from 8 May, the anniversary of Hitler's defeat, by proclaiming it a vacation and Nazi liberation day. Can you explain to us what 8 May means to the FRG?

[Kohl] The first president of the FRG, Theodor Heuss, described 8 May as a day when we Germans were both liberated and at the same time annihilated. For us it is a day of deliberation and self-analysis. A day to remember and mourn the millions of losses claimed by the war and the victims of the tyranny of inhuman, racist madness. For us 8 May is indeed the day when the war officially ended, but for many of our fellow countrymen in prison or escaping to a new homeland or to rebuild a new life the suffering of war was not yet over. This date reminds us of our history, from which we have learned. On 8 May 1985 we will pray for peace and freedom.

[Vannuccini] Mr Chancellor, many people in Europe and in Germany, too, believe that the political situation over the German borders, on which you place so much emphasis, is merely a formal detail. You said recently that Germany cannot relinquish this legal position to anyone. Could you provide a better explanation of this concept, which seems to be rather misunderstood outside Germany?

[Kohl] I do not believe it is misunderstood outside Germany. Anyone who sees the Berlin wall, which divides our old capital, understands us. Anyone who finds himself in the middle of Germany confronted by a barbed wire fence which divides German from German, splits families, and prevents young people from coming together, even though they want to, understands us. It also understood that it is no formal detail that people should be able to travel freely and freely decide their own political destiny. These are basic human rights, and no generation can surrender the future generations' right to self-determination. What we can do and have already done is abandon violence. We know that we can achieve improvement of the situation in Central Europe only with our neighbors, not against them.

FRG DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON SDI PARTICIPATION

Clarifies Weinberger 'Deadline'

DW031257 Baden Baden Suedwestfunk Network in German 1035 GMT 2 Apr 85

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by correspondent Linketscher, date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Linketscher] Will your U.S. colleague Weinberger stick with his ultimatumlike demand that the alliance partners should decide within 60 days whether they want to take part in the space weapons program?

[Woerner] My colleague Weinberger has made it clear that this deadline is not at all an ultimatum. He just wanted to make it clear that programs are running and that those who want to take part in them must hurry up. He also made it clear that, naturally, any interest will be taken into consideration at any time, if possible.

[Linketscher] Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) fear that in case of successful research, space weapons will soon be developed and deployed. What is the position of the U.S. Government and what is yours?

[Woerner] The U.S. Government has made it clear that for the time being only a research program is involved and not at all the development or even deployment. The U.S. has also made it clear that possible participation in research does not at all entail the compulsion to take part in development or even deployment.

[Linketscher] Do you expect, similar to the counterarmament quarrel, fierce public discussions about the SDI if the Federal Government participates at all in research?

[Woerner] Not at all. One thing has nothing at all to do with the other. In one case a nuclear system is involved, in the other case — the missile defense issue — a purely conventional system is involved. In the case of the missiles, weapons are involved that can be used also offensively, in the other case it is a purely defensive. One thing cannot at all be compared with the other, so that I do not foresee the same difficulties.

Comments on Dispute

DW041049 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1815 GMT 4 Apr 85

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by unidentified correspondent, date and place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Never before has a Federal Government been informed so intensively and thoroughly about a counterarmament or research project as this time in connection with the U.S. missile umbrella project. How come that there still is disagreement in the coalition on this project?

[Woerner] I do not see disagreement in the coalition. The Federal Government has worked out a clearly formulated standpoint on this ADI. The chancellor has repeatedly commented on it. The foreign minister and the defense minister have agreed. The coalition supports it, and that is it.

[Correspondent] You do not see any irritation due to different interpretations by the FDP, by Mr Genscher, Mr Moellemann, and you?

[Woerner] I cannot see any irritation on the part of the FDP and the foreign minister. Mr Moellemann is a special case, and I ask you to see it as such.

[Correspondent] Mr Minister, what is actually going on? A public discussion is going on at present. Some people are for it, other against. What is going to happen?

[Woerner] Research efforts exclusively are involved. The Americans are trying to find out whether it will be possible to ward off nuclear missiles. The Soviets have been doing this for years. The question is now whether these research efforts are legitimate. The Federal Government says yes clearly. The other question is whether we should take part. We are examining this at present. It depends on many prerequisites which the chancellor has mentioned repeatedly, such as fair partnerships, exchange of information, technological transfer, and so on. It will take some time for us to examine all this thoroughly. Then we will decide whether we will participate.

[Correspondent] Mr Minister, if this project is implemented, what effect would it have on NATO's defense strategy?

[Woerner] This is one of the questions that is still open and that nobody can answer at the moment. There are certainly many individual problems we still must examine in connection with the research. Therefore, the Federal Government reserves to itself the decision on the deployment in both ways; At the moment, neither yes or no seems possible.

[Correspondent] Will this shield against missiles be also effective against short-range and intermediate-range missiles?

[Woerner] We have always said that the unity of NATO's territory must be maintained strategically, politically, and militarily. If work is being done on such protective measures, protection must naturally be included against missiles threatening Europe—not only strategic missiles, but also intermediate and short-range missiles. However, there also exist technological and other problems that are not yet solved. We are

at the beginning of research work and not at the end, let alone making a decision now on whether deployment should take place. That can take place in 5, 8, or 10 years.

[Correspondent] Mr Minister, what concrete information does the Federal Government have with regard to the Soviet Union's or the East bloc's space weapons plans?

[Woerner] We have received most detailed information about this from the Americans in the Nuclear Planning Group. I have just now seen satellite pictures in Washington. Since the late sixties, the Soviet Union has uninterruptedly continued research work on such defense systems. It is the only one of the two superpowers that has set up a functioning antisatellite system. It is the only one of the two superpowers that has a functioning defense system of that kind, around Moscow, that was granted to it as well as to the Americans according to the ABM treaty. The Soviet Union has made use of it, the Americans have so far not.

[Correspondent] How do you explain the existing clear anti-Americanism, particularly in connection with SDI?

[Woerner] Some people try to use everything on the market as an instrument for their political ideology. This is very clear in this case, although defensive and non-nuclear systems are involved, and although the Soviets have been doing this for more than 2 decades without anybody getting excited about it. But as soon as the Americans do it, some people think differently and try to make it appear a weapon against the people.

CSO: 5200/2548

FRG DEFENSE MINISTER VIEWS IMPLICATIONS OF SDI RESEARCH

LD061548 Hamburg DPA in German 1037 GMT 6 Apr 85

[Text] Hamburg, 6 Apr (DPA) -- In the opinion of Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) the Introduction of missile defense systems in space calls for a new determination of the balance of offensive and defensive systems. Woerner told the newspaper WELT AM SONNTAG it would be desirable for this change to take place in amity between the Soviets and the Americans. The West is seeking stability and not striving for superiority. It is enough "to neutralize the adversary's options." This means a balance of forces, which can however, be achieved in various ways.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative SDI makes a rethinking of the NATO strategy necessary in Woerner's view. If new technological discoveries come to light as a result of research, their strategic significance must be thought through. Only then can the question one day be answered whether this will contribute to more stability and so prevent war. However it must be taken into account that it will be at least 10 years before whether such systems would have to be stationed could be considered. Until then the current strategy will apply.

Woerner accused the opposition SPD of trying to torpedo the U.S. SDI initiative at the start without being able to prevent Soviet research. This will remove the incentive for the Soviet's to negotiate and also increase the danger of the USSR achieving superiority over the United States.

The defense minister named two causes of the Soviet attacks on the American space weapons plans. First, the Soviet Union fears that the Americans soon will outstrip it in this area as a result of technological superiority. Second, there exists an opportunity here for driving a wedge between the Americans and the Europeans.

A decision by the Federal Government on the time for possible FRG participation in the SDI research program is not in sight. The talks between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl occasioned by the world economic summit in Bonn in May will certainly be important for the Federal Government's decision, but it is not for heads of government to discuss the details of possible participation.

FRG ECONOMICS MINISTER ON EAST'S SECURITY INTERESTS, SDI

LD241557 Hamburg DPA in German 1412 GMT 24 Mar 85

[Text] Heilbronn, 24 Mar (DPA)—Speaking in Heilbronn on 24 March, FDP Chairman Martin Bangemann called for "sensible give and take" with the eastern neighbors. At a ceremony to mark the 125th anniversary of the birth of Friedrich Naumann, the economics minister said: "If we do not have the strength to continue a policy of sensible give-and-take with our eastern neighbors, if we are not prepared to recognize that they also have security interests and act accordingly, then we will not be able to win this debate on peace in the world."

Bangemann also referred to the current discussion on the space missile defense system. It is true that the concept of deterrence has so far preserved peace, he said. It must be asked, however, whether the development of antimissile systems could not lead to an imbalance and whether the other side would accept the undoing of this balance.

Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) was cofounder and chairman of the Liberal German Democratic Party following World War I.

FRG'S STRAUSS CALLS FOR KOHL'S 'CLEAR DECISIONS' ON SDI

LD021212 Hamburg DPA in German 1127 GMT 2 Apr 85

[Text] Munich, 2 Apr (DPA) -- Franz Josef Strauss, CSU chairman and Bavarian minister president, has called on Federal Chancellor Kohl to face the consequences of the incident concerning Juergen Moellemann, FDP minister of state in the Foreign Ministry. Helmut Kohl must get rid of the "growing irritation in the United States" by clear decisions.

In answering a DPA question in Munich today, Strauss reacted to Moellemann's remarks at a German-American conference in Dallas. With his comments on a "wait-and-see attitude of the Federal Government" on the research program for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Moellemann caused differences with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner.

Strauss stated that the European allies and the American partner in the alliance must finally know where they stand. Moellemann without doubt in the wrong place and before the wrong audience gave his opinion which he shared with his minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had no doubts about his aversion to the project. But the citizen no longer knows where he stands, "because every day he reads a different heading in the newspapers." There must be an end to the "confusing game about the Federal Republic's participation" in the SDI.

FRG'S GENSCHER, STRAUSS ON EUROPEAN SDI PARTICIPATION

Genscher Urges European Unity

LD011327 Hamburg DPA in German 1218 GMT 1 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn, 1 Apr (DPA)--On the question of Europe's participation in the contentious American SDI research program Bonn ought to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with France and the other European partners, according to Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. This would be good for the Federal Republic, for German-French friendship, for the cohesion of the Europeans, and for the unity of the European-American alliance, Genscher said to the FDP Presidium today.

According to party spokesman Herbert Schmuelling the foreign minister pointed out that both Paris and Bonn at the last German-French summit in Paris and on subsequent occasions expressed their wish for a joint stance. Talks concerning this question are also planned with other European states.

Strauss Favors Participation

LD291746 Hamburg DPA in German 1514 GMT 29 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 29 Mar (DPA)—CSU chairman Franz Josef Strauss has strongly criticized the Bonn government coalition's attitude to the American SCI research program. In an interview in tomorrow's BILD he said: "There is too much talk; it's back and forth." A confusing picture is being presented to the public. Every day one can read something new "yes, then no, yes, no, like counting off buttons."

Strauss said that despite all the niceties of protocol vis-a-vis the United States, no one can disguise the fact that a creeping estrangement between Bonn and Washington has begun and is leading to increased irritation on the part of the Americans.

Strauss spoke out clearly in favor of participation in the U.S. program. With arms in space, the importance of nuclear weapons on earth will be restricted and the danger of a nuclear war thus diminished. Moreover, the enormous research in connection with the SDI will lead to as yet undreamed of technological progress.

cso: 5200/2548

FRG POLITICIAN CRITICIZES SDI, EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT

LD041034 Hamburg DPA in German 0820 GMT 4 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn, 4 Apr (DPA) -- SPD group deputy chairman Horst Ehmke has expressed strong criticism of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and has advised against European participation. Ehmke told journalists in Bonn last night that in reality it is a matter of European participation, not only in the initial research program, but also in the planned arms program.

Those who believe they can "drop out" later do not understand the psychology of the alliance. "We have more influence if we remain outside," Ehmke said. The plans to station non-nuclear missile defense systems in space will only lead to a new arms race. In any case no one can force the Soviet Union not to respond to this with nuclear weapons.

Ehmke however indicated that he is convinced U.S. President Reagan will find a majority for his plans. In the United States an atmosphere of anticipation prevails. "The matter is already wrapped up there," Ehmke said. He suggested that the research plans could also be carried out on a civilian level and warned against subordinating such projects to the interests of the military sector.

The SPD politician accused the Americans of merely wanting to exploit the Europeans' scientific potential. "The one issue that is at stake is whether people will be drawn into the overall program through the bait of research." The Europeans would make a bad deal in the process. "They will get what they want out of it," Ehmke said with reference to American plans, "without wanting to pay for it." The Europeans' decision could lead to consequences lasting for decades in their relations with the East. It is to be hoped that they will give themselves enough time to establish a position.

FRG POLITICAL FIGURES OPPOSE SDI INVOLVEMENT

SPD's Ehmke Statement

LD091154 Hamburg DPA in German 1106 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn, 9 Apr (DPA)—Horst Ehmke, the deputy SPD group chairman, has warned against European involvement in the research plans of the American Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program of armaments in space. Ehmke described it to journalists on Tuesday as "impolitic" to expect that by getting into research, responsibility for armaments will not also be taken up. Whoever allows themselves to be caught with the "bait" of research will be hooked on the whole program.

With these words, the SPD politician also explained a resolution which his group made before Easter and which has now been published. It says that participation in the SDI program will result in the support and the involvement in American plans for the active military use of space. Hopes about influencing or preventing the U.S. plans in this way are unrealistic and purely wishful thinking.

Ehmke spoke in favor of removing the basic research component from the SDI. There is no reason not to conduct research from a civilian viewpoint. It is urgently necessary that in this connection Europe assembles its interests and represents this package as a counterproposal to the U.S. plans.

Ehmke represents the view that the SDI program will lead much more quickly to a new arms race than to a treaty on arms limitation. This cannot wait 5 years, the planned duration of the research program. The Soviet Union has to react before this. Armaments in space will not lead to the replacement of offensive by defensive weapons but to a combination of both systems. In addition nothing can prevent the Soviet Union from responding with nuclear weapons.

SDI Research Rejected

DW091229 Saarbruecken Saarlaendischer Rundfund Network in German 1005 GMT 6 Apr 85

[Interview with SPD Bundestag Deputy Wolfgang Roth by correspondent Schneider in the "Das Interview" program; date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Schneider] The SPD Bundestag faction rejects participation in the U.S. SDI research program. You are said to have brought influence to bear on it that the resolution formulated by your Saarland colleague Fischer stresses economic-technological reasons for the rejection. Why are they so grave?

[Roth] The first point is that for years the transfer of technology from the United States to Europe has been hindered for strategic reasons, even if private firms are involved. I consider it most risky to base the technological future of Europe on the assumption of an unhindred flow of information and knowledge in the high technology field.

The second point is on another level. I believe that we have enormous problems on earth and a great necessity to get them under control, just think of environmental protection. If we would now participate in a U.S. research program that will cost \$27 billion according to current statements, it would mean that the FRG would have to participate in such a program with at least DM10-20 billion in order to get something out of it.

My alternative is to put forth a number of European demands. The Federal Government already said, although not officially, that it does not want to take part in the French space project called Hermes. In other words, we would in the long run and at least to a great extent depend on the Americans in a situation when you clearly notice that the United States is gradually loosening its firm ties with Europe. That is a long-term decision which I believe cannot be made that way on this level.

I also believe that Europe has research aims and research problems different from the superpower United States. In other words, all the economic-political aspects I see actually speak for an independent, compact European program that must naturally be coordinated in many aspects with U.S. projects. That is also the case with our Kolumbus space shuttle. I am for cooperation, but not for dependence.

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FRG GOVERNMENT PUBLISHES STATEMENT ON SDI ISSUE

'Text' of Statement

LD271552 Hamburg DPA in German 1430 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 27 Mar (DPA)--The text of the Federal Government's statement on President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), published in Bonn today, is as follows:

1. The American-Soviet negotiations, which began on 12 March 1985 and with which the two great powers have linked the desire for a general improvement of their relations, open up new possibilities for East-West relations as a whole. A stable relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is decisive for flourishing developments in Europe. There is now an opportunity, based on the existing agreements and the CSCE process, to arrive at more stable and more durable East-West relations which include positive developments in the political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres. We Germans have a special interest in improvements for the people in our divided country.

This development confirms the Harmel concept of the Western alliance, strongly supported by the Federal Government, which calls for constructive dialogue and extensive cooperation on the basis of guaranteed defense capability.

As a result of the meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko the following, among other things, was agreed on January 8th, 1985:

Both sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions that will concern space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range weapons, and indeed with all the questions that must be brought into consideration and solved with respect to their reciprocal relationship. The aim of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements directed at preventing an arms race in space, at ending it on earth and at limiting and reducing nuclear weapons and strengthening strategic stability.

The Federal Government supports the negotiating goals set out in this statement.

- 2. In the opinion of the Federal Government the following is necessary in accordance with the negotiating goals formulated in Geneva:
- -- To prevent an arms race in space, end it on earth and to consolidate strategic stability,

- -- To drastically reduce and limit nuclear strategic and medium-range weapons, which also is in accordance with the preamble to the ABM treaty and Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty,
- -- To allow research by both sides on the SDI and its problems to lead to cooperative solutions,
- -- To reaffirm [bekraeftigen] the ABM treaty as long as no other mutual agreements have been concluded.

In this connection, the Federal Government points to the statement in the declaration of 8 January 1985 that the issues on the agenda for negotiation are to be weighed and solved in their "interrelationship." In this, particular significance will be attached to the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons for the strengthening of stability.

3. The security policy of the Federal Government and of the alliance is and remains the policy of preventing war of any type. All our efforts in the sphere of deterrence, defense, disarmament, and arms control are directed toward this goal.

The Federal Government considers it of decisive importance that the whole spectrum of the military balance of forces between West and East should be incorporated into the arms control dialogue: no type of weapon should be exempt from negotiations. We want concrete progress in:

- -- The Vienna negotiations on bilateral and balanced troop reductions in Central Europe
- -- The Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe
- -- The negotiations on the complete worldwide ban on chemical weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference.
- 4. President Reagan has repeatedly made clear that the SDI is a long-term research program directed exclusively at defense, whose goal is to examine possibilities for the development of new non-nuclear antiballistic missile defense systems. It is to be established whether it may be technologically possible to reduce the threat from ballistic missiles by new defensive systems which would also protect the United States' allies.
- 5. The Federal Government welcomes the U.S. Government's statement that
- -- No superiority is being sought by means of the SDI
- -- The results of the research phase must be awaited before decision which go beyond research can be made
- -- It is ready for continuous and intensive consultations with its allies.
- 6. The treaty on the limitation of ABM systems of 1972 permits research work. All the signs speak for the view that the Soviet Union has been exploring for a long time new technology which could be used for antimissile purposes; in addition, the Soviet Union possesses the only ABM system capable of functioning and is modernizing it. Research for the U.S. President's SDI is therefore justified.

- 7. We are also in agreement with our alliance partners that
- -- The strategy of flexible response must remain effective, without change, for the alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for the goal of preventing war,
- -- The political and strategic unity of the alliance must remain protected,
- -- The security of Europe must not be detached from the security of the United States,
- -- The conventional imbalance in Europe must be reduced.
- 8. The Federal government welcomes the fact that intensive consultations by the U.S. Government with the alliance partners are taking place on all subjects in the Geneva negotiations and on issues concerning the SDI. They are indispensible for us and emphasize what importance the United States attaches to agreement with its alliance partners.
- 9. The Federal Government will use these consultations in the alliance for strengthening the Western negotiating position and in the interests of the unity of the alliance.
- 10. The Federal Government will continuously pursue and assess the economic and technological aspects of the SDI research program.

It will also, with regard to the SDI, continue to endeavor to ensure that the Europeans will bring a united attitude to the consultations.

Participation Left 'Open'

LD271312 Hamburg DPA in German 1233 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 27 Mar (DPA)—The Federal Government continues to leave open its position on participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. This is clear from a statement of the Federal Security Council in Bonn today. Commenting on this, government sources said the government did not see itself in a position at the present time to decide upon involvement in the research and in measures going beyond this. Further clarification from the Americans and within the alliance are necessary beforehand.

According to these sources, the Federal Government also does not regard U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's letter as an offer to cooperate, but as an invitation for general reflections on the realization of such a project. The letter will not be answered for the time being, it was stated in Bonn. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl will discuss the entire issue on 2 May during President Reagan's visit to the Federal Republic. Also to be discussed is Weinberger's request, contained in his letter, that a reply be received within 60 days.

FRG FIGURES ASSESS SDI, EUROPEAN ROLE

Defense Committee Briefing

LD271545 Hamburg DPA in German 1421 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 27 Mar (DPA)—The parties represented in the Bundestag have passed different judgments on the American SDI. This was made clear after a delegation from Washington briefed the Bundestag Defense Committee. The committee chairman, Alfred Biehle (CSU), expressed the view that the U.S. research must not take place without the Europeans, if West Europe does not want to lose technological contact.

The Defense Committee was briefed by the delegation under the leadership of Bob Dean, deputy director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the U.S. State Department. The party representatives were also impressed by the remarks by General James Abrahamson, head of the Pentagon office of strategic defense. The envoys also wanted to brief the working group on space issues formed in the Chancellor's Office. The Federal Security Council, the Federal Government's most secret body, also deals with space defense.

For the CDU, Willy Wimmer pointed to the fact that the Soviet Union has been going "at full steam" in military space research. He demanded partnership with equal rights between Americans and West Europeans in future work. Biehle (CSU) said that the defense system serves the interests of the stabilization of peace. He spoke of a "great thing," because now only materials, and weapons systems are at stake, and not people. Olaf Feldmann (FDP) said: "I cannot yet judge whether it will be a great thing." He considered it premature to judge all this so early. Feldmann welcomed the fact that the Americans are dealing with the Europeans' reservations. Agreement by Europeans is necessary.

Ewirn Horn (SPD) thinks that the effects of the new technology cannot be foreseen. Humanity must not be "overtaken" by them. Peace must not become dependent on computers. Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group called on the Federal Government and the Bundestag to reject participation by the Federal Republic in the U.S. plans with public research funds. Horst Ehmke (SPD) stressed that the SPD would oppose all attempts to "launch a new, gigantic and, from the viewpoint of defense policy, senseless arms programe."

Roland Vogt of the Greens made clear his party's absolute rejection. He accused the United States of attempting to get the allies caught up in a new technologically-based military strategy. He spoke of a "rapid entanglement of the Europeans."

SPD's Ehmke Notes Contradictions

LD271904 Hamburg DPA in German 1106 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 27 Mar (DPA)—Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag group, described the U.S.' pressing for decisions as quickly as possible on the SDI as creating panic, on Wednesday. Presenting documentation with a comprehensive analysis of the East-West threat, Ehmke pointed to the contradictions in the American position: previously the United States had claimed that only the extensive advances in SDI research had brought the Soviets back to the Geneva negotiating table—now the latest justification was that the West must hurry up because of the great Soviet lead.

The analysis of the threat, in which politicians, scientists and former military men are taking part, works on the assumption that nobody in the West seriously suspects the Soviets of intending a conventional attack on Europe. Proceeding from this premise, the demands which actually ought to be made of NATO are examined. The experts were united in the thesis that Soviet arms served the purpose of preservation of power, but not the goal of world domination or "political gains in Europe." Ehmke stated that the analysis, which did not have any rigid validity, must lead to consideration of constant adaptation to realities.

SPD's Bahr: U.S. 'Unreasonable'

LD280945 Hamburg DPA in German 0401 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Hannover, 28 Mar (DPA) -- SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr has accused the United States of treating the Europeans in an unreasonable way by demanding involvement in research on the U.S. SDI. In an interview in today's edition of NEUE PRESSE, published in Hannover, Bahr states: "I do not consider it an appropriate way of dealing with allies that America should discuss SDI for 2 years and then give the Europeans a 60-day ultimatum". The question arises: "Should the Europeans allow themselves to be treated in this way? If the answer is yes, then they don't deserve any better."

Bahr sees a joint European position as the sole chance for achieving their own interests in the SDI. "The important thing for influencing the direction of the Americans is a joint reply and a joint stance by the Europeans." Bahr also sees no possibility of paying the DM10 billion that the Federal Republic should raise for its share of the research, unless, he says, one wants to make cuts in the renewal of the Bundeswehr's conventional arms, in other research programs and social expenditure or to simply let the money printing press roll. Bahr urges the Federal Government "to say at last how it intends to pay at all for the German research contribution to SDI." An edited version of the interview was prereleased to DPA.

cso: 5200/2549

SDI ISSUE DRAWS COMMENT FROM FRG LEADERS, PRESS

Boenisch, Woerner Remarks

LD281447 Hamburg DPA in German 1248 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 28 Mar (DPA)—The Federal Government today countered the impression that it wants to distance itself from American plans for an antimissile system in space. Sources close to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl quoted him as saying that he had always urged that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) be "examined sympathetically." At the same time the chancellor's office stressed that Kohl would discuss the whole problem at his meeting with Reagan on 2 May in Bonn.

Speaking for the CSU, the party's Bundestag Land Caucas foreign and defense policy spokesman, Count Hans Huyn, said that Bonn must stop constantly imposing conditions on the Americans. The United States is working on the West's security. "We must cooperate with all our might here, not with the attitude of someone who is being forced to go along, but in friendly and open preparedness." The government parties must adopt a "positive and predictable position" towards the United States and in the NATO alliance.

Today Government spokesman Peter Boenisch also contradicted the view that U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger gave a 60-day ultimatum for a reply in his letter to the Western allies. Pointing to talks held by an American delegation, including General James Abrahamson from the U.S. Defense Department, Boenisch said that from the American viewpoint the limit was set because of "administrative coordination." Possible agreements on cooperation are not bound to this limit. Decisions on participation in the SDI research program are also possible at any time after the expiry of the 60-day limit.

Weinberger's 60-day deadline caused irritation in Bonn, where today government circles still see this passage in the letter as posing political problems. First reactions to the letter made it clear that Bonn will not allow itself to be put under pressure. It was stressed that the letter will not be answered for the time being and will be a subject in the talk between Kohl and Reagan.

The Chancellor's Office pointed to yesterday's Federal Government statement on the SDI in which decisions are left open. The statement also expresses reservations about detaching Europe from the American security system. It also stresses that NATO's deterrence strategy must not be given up as long as there is no alternative.

It was said in Bonn today that there are no important differences between this government statement, which was unanimously adopted by the Federal Security Council, and the chancellor's speech at the defense studies meeting in Munich in February. In the past, the chancellor also emphasized the conditions for German participation.

Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner told DEUTSCHE WELLE that the entire research program should span several years, "which means that there is no pressure." The Defense Ministry circulated a paper on the fringes of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Luxembourg with details of the areas in which German industry could cooperate with the United States in the SDI. This step, taken in cooperation with Washington, and remarks from government sources pointing out that the decision is still open, gave rise to the impression of an uncoordinated stance within the Federal Government.

SPD's Vogel

LD281601 Hamburg DPA in German 1354 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn, 28 Mar (DPA) -- Hans-Jochen Vogel, leader of the SPD opposition in the Bundestag, has accused the United States of treatment "that is customary with vassals but not with allies." In a press statement in Bonn today, Vogel referred to the letter from U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and to the U.S. demand that the allies should reply within 60 days on participation in the U.S. SDI.

This event makes the Federal Republic's loss of weight in NATO clear. During the term of office of SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt "no U.S. Administration would have allowed itself to treat our country in such a manner," he said. Vogel reminded the federal chancellor of his duty to make it clear to the U.S. Administration "in all friendship, that we are the allies and not the vassals of the United States."

He welcomed, moreover, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's emphasis on reservations about the SDI. Chancellor Kohl is following him more and more. Unfortunately, this development is being checked by "secret papers put into circulation in Luxembourg" by Defense Minister Manfred Woerner. These papers signalled "complete compliance with Weinberger's demands."

DIE WELT Commentary

DW282142 Bonn DIE WELT in German 28 Mar 85 p 1

[Commentary by Herbert Kremp: "The Invitation"]

[Text] The U.S. invitation to allied and friendly countries to participate in the research for the SDI offers a military as well as an economic perspective. Technologically, the Americans are in a position to work on the project all alone. The great amounts of money that they are investing speak for their commitment and optimism. The Soviets have understood.

What is behind the desire to get partners is politics. Washington wants to let the allies participate because the SDI is changing the valid strategy picture. Deterrence, in theory, is shifting from the capability to destroy to the capability to defend. This raises questions concerning the radius of the protective shield and the balance of conventional armed forces in Europe. This was pointed out by the federal chancellor at the international defense forum.

However, what is of more immediate interest is the economic perspective. The project is hastening technological development with the speed of missiles. Its military aspect cannot be separated from the civilian economic aspect. The Japanese have come to realize it. German comment warns that Europe must not be "uncoupled" technologically. This is rather starry-eyed. The technological process and its economic consequences in the United States are independent of outside factors ["selbstlaeufer"]. They are based on business interests. The space project stimulates research and market. Those who want to participate in modernization must go along. The Germans are faced with a challenge.

The United States has sent entire staffs to inform the allies about the strategic and technological perspectives. They are meeting with interest but also with anxiety.

At first the Federal Government had reservations regarding its participation in the implementation of the SDI, but now seems to hesitate also on whether or not to cooperate in the research. The Soviets are against it. However, research and choices are free. The technological cooperation poses questions which must be clarified. What is more important, however, is the point that the Americans will not allow anybody, including those who want to leave their options open, to stop them from pursuing their project.

FRG'S GENSCHER DISCUSSES PARTIES' STANCE ON SDI

THE RICHARD CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR

DW251131 Baden-Baden Suedwestfunk Network in German 1145 GMT 24 Mar 85

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Reiss; date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Genscher] I hope for the chance to open a new chapter in East-West relations and thus introduce a new phase of realistic detente. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the opening of negotiations on space weapons is indicative of the fact that this chance exists.

The talks we had with the Soviet Union, the talk the chancellor had with the GDR state council chairman in Moscow, and the dialogue we have conducted with other Warsaw Pact governments reaffirm our conviction that the Warsaw Pact states also are interested in overcoming the stagnation of and even setbacks in East-West relations. What is important now is to utilize 1985, and we believe that the Europeans must play a decisive role in this new phase. We are sitting at many negotiating tables — the disarmament committee in Geneva, the European Disarmament Conference in Stockholm, and the negotiations on the reduction of forces in Central Europe. Indeed, there are chances, and we must do everything to help them materialize.

This time they [the United States and the Soviet Union] have come to terms not only on the date for the negotiations, but also on the topics and objectives of the negotiations. In this respect the joint communique contains an important passage — both sides are agreed that the negotiations will be a complexity of questions concerning space weapons and nuclear weapons of intermediate and strategic range, and negotiations are for discussing and resolving all these problems of their relations.

I believe that the German public has paid too little attention to what has been said beyond that about the objectives of the negotiations. They said that they wanted to prevent an arms race in space, which means preventing such an arms race from even beginning and pursuing preventive arms control; they said that they wanted to halt the arms race on earth. This means that the statement of 8 January 1985 is a statement of extremely great political as well as moral significance. I believe that we, as Europeans, have every reason to do our utmost to promote and facilitate these negotiations and to create good conditions for them through our contribution toward the policy of detente and cooperation.

[Reiss] Notwithstand the objective so clearly defined by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz, the decisive security problem in Geneva so far has been space armament. The Soviets intend to prevent President Reagan's strategic defense initiative [SDI], and Chancellor Kohl has said that successes in the other

two fields under negotiation might make this project superfluous. But this is exactly what the U.S. President denied a few weeks ago. Why is the Federal Government reserved in its judgment of the space defense system and in its decision on cooperation in its development, and why does it convey the impression of concern and misgivings?

[Genscher] The project you mentioned involves a research program and not the decision on whether research will turn into development and development into production, and production into deployment. Earlier in this interview we pointed out that the different fields of negotiations — the strategic weapons, the intermediate range weapons, and the space armament — are interrelated. This is why the chancellor in his speech to the Essen CDU Congress justly drew attention to this interrelation.

He said that the greater the chance in Geneva to significantly reduce the nuclear offensive weapons in East and West, the more superfluous it might become to deploy space-based systems. This represents the interrelation, and this also shows that rapid progress in the negotiations can indeed bring about the effects to which the chancellor referred.

This, by the way, is congruent to the stance of the FDP. We adopted a decision on this at a Federal Executive Board meeting yesterday, using nearly identical terminology. Hence we can say that the coalition parties are harmonizing closely on these questions.

After all, the United States also advocated the view that an arms race in space must be prevented. Thus the United States in this joint statement advocated the very same stance, the very same objective which the chancellor expressed in that speech.

The chancellor in his party congress speech also discussed the question of potential strategic instabilities in the research phase. He said that it is important to reaffirm the so-called ABM treaty as long as no joint agreements have been concluded which would newly define the proportions of defensive and offensive weapons.

European participation in research projects also is a question which the Europeans should jointly decide upon and answer, but first the Americans would have to officially invite us to participate. What I mean to say is that it is also important for Europe to assess its interest in this regard and to define a common stand.

[Reiss] It was not for the first time that statements on your part were publicly interpreted as differing from the view of the chancellor. Do you regard these as outside attempts to counteract your policy of continuity and predictability in foreign affairs now that you no longer are foreign minister and coalition leader in the cabinet at the same time?

[Genscher] I fail to see how anybody can be so foolish as to try anything of the sort. I advise anyone making the attempting to compare the speech of the chancellor at the Essen party congress with the FDP Federal Executive Board's decision on Saturday on my suggestion; conformity of views exists.

CHANGE IN BONN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SDI SEEN

DW221233 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 22 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Horst Schreitter-Schwarzenfeld: "Bonn Begins To Hesitate Over Star Wars"]

[Text] Bonn -- Defense Minister Manfred Woerner likes to see himself in the role of an active man, quick to make decisions. However, this active man becomes a hesitating Prince Hamlet as soon as he speaks of "star wars." He recently admitted that he had thought about this issue more than any other. "The greatest strategic change since the invention of the atom bomb," he defined it. He continues to be occupied by the question of whether SDI, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, would make the world more stable.

The question is whether or not to cooperate. Bonn's entire political scene seems to be populated by hesitating Hamlets. Woerner does not stand alone. The desire not to let relations with the United States be endangered by anything is considered by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's advisers to be the basic tenet of their foreign policy. Helmut Schmidt's nagging complaints about former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is warning for them. Above all, they do not want any signs of deteriorating German loyalty to the United States to reach Moscow, so no frank words are spoken.

However, in private talks, much of Bonn's insecurity in following the U.S. SDI can be felt. The problem for the people in charge in Bonn is naive fascination with SDI, with the idea of replacing the principle of retaliation, including nuclear weapons, with the principle of defense. After all, defense is also the purpose of FRG security policy, but deterrence through retaliation is still its political principle.

SDI aims to destroy attacking missiles in flight — at the beginning, middle, or end of the flight; from the earth or a platform in space. The technology for SDI has not been developed yet, and no one knows if it ever will be. Some \$26 billion have been made available in the United States for research. The principle of SDI is understood by every child who tries his hand at the "Space Invaders" computer game.

The political and strategic consequences of SDI frighten many observers. No matter how tempting the idea of "defense instead of retaliation" may be, the question is being raised as to whether the possibility of defense against nuclear attack will not provide the stimulus to build an increased number of bigger and better attack weapons. Therefore, FRG military circles are demanding that we should embark toward SDI only jointly and with agreement between the East and West.

To express their insecurity over a development that has taken them by surprise, the Bonn politicians have found a number of polite diplomatic responses. The latest example is an article signed by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The text was published by the Foreign Ministry's press service on Monday in the series titled, "The Foreign Minister Informs." The term "Strategic Defense Initiative" was not even mentioned. It was only said that the strategy of flexible response strategy must "continue to be valid." They have become very careful. This was a reminder from the conservatives to the American innovators.

If there is a key phrase in Bonn's discussion about SDL, it is the following: space weapons must be eliminated through negotiations before they come into existence.

The writers of Genscher's text also used this expression. The chancellor said something very similar at the CDU meeting in Essen. Kohl said at the Geneva negotiations, that it is important to consolidate stability and to prevent an arms race in spance and on earth. A "cooperative solution" is required, he said. Through progress in Geneva, the deployment of space weapons should become unnecessary, he maintained.

Behind Kohl's formulation, a rewawakend longing for a zero solution, stands Horst Teltschick, the chancellor's foreign policitical adviser. Under Teltschick, a newly established working circle in the chancellor's office is dealing with space issues and the question of Bonn's approach to SDI. The Research Ministry, the Defense Ministry in Brigadier General Rolf Huettel and the Foreign Ministry in Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, are represented in the Star Wars round discussions. For the time being, they are waiting attentively for a U.S. invitation for West Europe to participate in SDI.

One thing is known for certain by the those in charge in Bonn: developments toward space research are being made. The direction of these developments is being followed with some anxiety.

FRG PAPERS NOTE EUROPEAN 'DISILLUSIONMENT' WITH SDI

DW250959 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 25 Mar 85

[From the press review]

[Text] We quote some editorial comment on the discussion of the U.S. President's space weapons plans.

The Kassel HESSISCHE NIEDERSAECHSISCHE ALLGEMEINE notes: Resistance to Reagan's Star Wars plans is developing in Europe. The initial euphoria over the idea of an impregnable protective shield has been followed by disillusionment. If the two superpowers become immune to nuclear missiles, the strategy of deterrence will no longer be effective. In that case, Europe would be dissociated from the United States and completely exposed to the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. Such anxieties are causing the NATO allies to consider it advisable to carefully repudiate Reagan's SDI. Moscow should not misinterpret this European reserve.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of Munich stresses the following point:

Under Kohl's leadership, Bonn is distancing itself from the SDI project more each day. Bonn has now also joined with public opinion in Paris and London. This has caused the Soviets, whose number one man has charged the chancellor with always standing at attention before Reagan, to sit up and take notice. Foreign Minister Genscher scarcely had to pull the chancellor over to the only position Bonn can hold; the chancellor came over of his own volition. As a whole, the government sees more dangers than opportunities for overall security in the U.S. president's vision. The reason Kohl had been regarded for some time as advocating Bonn's participation is that he had generally succumbed to the misconception that he would be better off in foreign policy than his predecessor, Helmut Schmidt, if he were to refrain from publicly contradicting the leading Western power.

FRG REPORTAGE, COMMENT ON SDI RESEARCH ISSUE

Dispute on Participation

DW251229 Bonn DIE WELT in German 23-24 Mar 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Herbert Kremp: "Some Uncertainties About Genscher's Deportment"]

[Text] Bonn -- Both the Foreign Office and the Office of the Federal President regard with skepticism the view of the Chancellor's Office that the FRG should participate in the research on space-based antimissile systems. The clear reserve with which President von Weizsaecker discussed the project as well as sharply phrased conditions and anxieties published by Foreign Minister Genscher in a signed article, had not been coordinated with the Chancellor's Office, DIE WELT learned.

Sources close to the chancellor are saying Genscher's article, which is addressed to all embassies, became known to the Chancellor's Office only in the form of an "announcement" to the press. The displeasure over this development was even enhanced by echoes in the media. The interpretation often voiced, that the text reflects a controversy between Kohl and Genscher over Washington's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) induced the Foreign Office to issue a mollifying follow-up statement which was issued to all German embassies. The Chancellor's Office is at a loss for an explanation of this development.

An interministerial expert group of the Federal Government has in context with the SDT compiled a list of questions which are to be discussed in Bonn next week with the head of the U.S. SDI research program, General Abrahamson. By this procedure, which is described as urgent, the Federal Government intends to create the preconditions to define the stand on important aspects of the defense system.

Chancellor Office personnel emphasizes that the Federal Republic intends to participate in the research in the field of novel antimissile systems. There is also conformity of views on this with the governments in Paris, London, and Rome. During the latest German-French summit on 27 and 28 February in Paris, President Mitterrand agreed with Chancellor Kohl's view that the European countries should jointly seek participation in the research project, they say.

French Defense Minister Hernu yesterday advocated participation in the research programs on space armament. In an AFP interview in which he emphasized France's "community of destiny" with the FRG, Hernu said: "being present in space means giving our security a new dimension."

Sources in Kohl's environment further stressed that the Federal Government clearly differentiates between participation in research and a potential implementation of the

antimissile system. The chancellor declared to the Essen CDU Congress Wednesday that he keeps the decision on the implementation of the SDI open "in both directions." First he intends to wait and see what the further course of the Geneva negotiations will be. This is how Kohl's words must be understood that space—based systems might become all the more superfluous the better possible it is in Geneva to tangibly reduce the nuclear offensive weapons in East and West. In Kohl's environment this idea is being valued as a "German contribution.

One of the most important questions which Washington so far has not answered pertains to the mode of German and European participation in the SDI research project. Bonn is not interested in singular orders which are handled in normal trade exchange. Bonn rather wishes to become active in integrated technological fields such as, optics and lasers. Besides, a technology transfer is important in both directions.

European Element Sought

DW261138 Bonn DIE WELT in German 26 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "U.S. Experts Inform Bonn About SDI Initiative"]

[Excerpt] Bonn -- The Federal Government and the Bundestag this week anticipate initial, comprehensive enlightenment by U.S. experts about the objectives of and the state of research work on the SDI. Heading a delegation General Abrahamson, the chief of the SDI program, will be coming to Bonn for detailed discussions with the Bundestag Committees for Foreign Affairs and Defense and with the governmental working group appointed by the chancellor's office. The Defense Committee will be informed Wednesday. Familiarization with the subject will continue in the chancellor's office in the afternoon of the same day and wind up Thursday with the briefing of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The U.S. delegation has been informed by the German side that it must reckon, above all, with the following questions:

What activities related to space armament can be observed in the Soviet Union?

In what research work is the United States currently engaged?

What effect will the implementation of the SDI and corresponding Soviet activities have on NATO strategy?

Would the implementation of the SDI preserve the principle of equal security for the United States and Western Europe?

In what way could the Western European NATO states participate in the SDI research and is there any concrete U.S. welcome for such participation?

What possibilities do the Americans see to extend the SDI with a component to ensure the strategic defense of Europe?

According to CDU defense expert Wimmer, the contemplation of enhancing the U.S. SDI research program by a 'tactical defense initiative' (TDI) in favor of Europe has found fertile soil in Washington. This is why General Abrahamson will be prepared for this question when he comes to Bonn. Reportedly a group in the Reagan Administration is

already concentrating on the subject in order to be able to give satisfactory answers to the European allies. In the opinion of experts the TDI component would have to do more than make possible defense against shorter-range ballistic missiles. Beyond that its mission would be the installation of a secure defense against nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft and cruise missiles.

According to Wimmer, Bonn Government quarters increasingly like the idea of developing a TDI component for Europe's protection against the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Just recently U.S. Vice President Bush stated that Europe's disengagement from the United States through a strategic protective shield will not occur. European experts derived from this statement that the U.S. Administration will probably readily meet corresponding wishes of the allies.

Rejection by SPD's Voight

LD270954 Hamburg DPA in German 0839 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Bonn 27 Mar (DPA) -- General James Abrahamson, head of the American research program for the SDI defensive weapons began to inform the Bundestag Defense Committee on Washington's detailed plans on Wednesday morning. In his first talk on Tuesday evening the general drew Bonn politicians' attention to the fact that the Soviets have been conducting research into the construction of space weapons since the beginning of the 1970's. Soviet work in this area has already made quite good progress.

In the course of the day Abrahamson wants to meet with the working group on space weapons formed in the chancellor's office and with members of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. The Federal Security Council, a secret federal body, also intends to concern itself with the SDI topic. On Tuesday, the United States officially invited all NATO partners, as well as Japan, Australia and Israel, to take part in its research program.

On Tuesday, in an interview distributed by the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, General Abrahamson justified the necessity for SDI research by referring to the Soviet lead in antimissile defense. There had been little understanding of the research efforts previously, Abrahamson stated. It is a question of destroying offensive missiles of any range, including those in Europe, on their way to their target. The program could also positively influence conventional defense. The objective is to convince the Soviet Union that investment in a defense which does not threaten the adversary is worthwhile.

Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group, on Wednesday called on the Federal Government and the Bundestag to reject participation by the Federal Republic in the American plans with public research resources. Such a use of public funds is not in the Federal Republic's interests from the viewpoint of security, disarmament and economic policy. Bonn instead ought to participate, in the spirit of Europe's technological and economic self-assertion, in joint west European initiatives for the civilian exploration of space.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE Editorial

DW251256 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Mar 85 p 1

[Editorial by Robert Held: "Keeping Expediently Silent"]

[Excerpts] It is generally known that silence prevails in space. Terrestrial conditions are the exact opposite. Within just a few days many people came out with their views on the SDI.

The responsible people in the West already have begun to talk this project into oblivion shortly before the KGB has sorted all its arguments for the next campaign and passed them on to the eligible, credulous distributors. As long as not even the technical preconditions have been clarified, the U.S. offer has not been detailed, our potentials has not been examined, and Parliament must not be heard yet (because no budget decisions must be made yet), our responsible people should feel free to keep quiet on the issue instead of coming out with manifoldly interpretable remarks. The interim period could be usefully exploited by enlightening the people about the fact that the Soviets have for years been playing 80 percent of their space games with military applications and that they stage maneuvers in space, destroying satellites with other satellites over our heads. There has been too much silence on this point so far; it is necessary to establish a balance in that respect.

cso: 5200/2549

FRG PRESS ON GENEVA TALKS, SDI

DW040955 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 4 Apr 85

[From the press review]

[Text] Editorials today deal among other things with U.S. SDI plans.

RHEINISCHE POST has the following to say about the disarmament dialogue of the two superpowers: During the Geneva negotiations Moscow suggested freezing the development, production, and deployment of space weapons. This is clearly aimed at the fiercely discussed U.S. SDI, including the necessary research work for the alleged protective space shield against missiles. The United States is pressing its partners, not only in Europe, to make up their minds at least with regard to research. It seems obvious that the Kremlin via Prague will try to influence this difficult and confusing process of opinion-building. It is certain that SDI is becoming more and more the center of the opinion-building. It is certain that SDI is becoming more and more the center of the Geneva disarmament negotiations with all the connected risks, including the failure of talks, writes the paper.

DIE WELT states: No, the Kremlin did not keep us long in suspense. The new star that has risen in the East does not indicate a new policy. Compared with earlier leaders, nothing has changed about Mikhail Gorbachev's instructions to his team for the Geneva talks on nuclear armament control and space defense.

A moratorium that would block even research work on space weapons is supposed to be valid up to the conclusion of the negotiations in an unforeseeable future. Naturally, that proposal is not expected to be accepted. It is plainly aimed at binding the hands of the Americans for years, while giving Soviet propaganda an opportunity to soften Western resistance and fan impatient illusions of peace.

FRG LEADERS DEBATE EUROPEAN SDI POSITIONS

CSU's Waigel Urges Participation

DW110505 Bonn DIE WELT in German 10 Apr 85 pp 1, 10

[Report by Manfred Schell: "Waigel: Only Participation in SDI Will Guarantee European Security"]

[Text] Bonn -- Theo Waigel, chairman of the CSU land group representation in the Bundestag, has demanded that the FRG and Europe participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research work of the Americans. In a talk with DIE WELT, Waigel said yesterday that such cooperation is "logical" for two main reasons: First, a country such as the FRG "must be among the leaders in technology and cannot lose any markets. It must take part in the leap into the next millennium; the FRG cannot lag behind or detach itself," he said. The second reason is that "only in this way can the Europeans promote their security policy interests."

Waigel believes that the Bundestag debate planned this month on the SDI will be "useful" in outlining the effects of this concept, "particularly its moral aspects." In this connection, the Soviet's efforts in this field must be considered, efforts that have been going on for more than a decade, he said.

Waigel said that there were no "views against" participation in the SDI research within the CSU. Regarding reservations expressed especially by Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP) and Minister of State Moellemann, Waigel stated: "I am proceeding on the assumption that the same clarity will be achieved here that the chancellor created at the military science meeting in Munich. He has not modified his statement. We are proceeding on the assumption that it continues to apply."

In connection with the SPD's strict rejection of participation in SDI research, Waigel said: "I do not understand the SPD's attitude at all — not from the economic, political, technological, or military-strategic points of view." He went on to say: "When I consider the SPD's security-policy substantiation of its stance, I fear that the SPD is far more concerned about the Soviet Union's security than about our own and that of the West. This is a macabre attitude." Waigel noted the phrase "perversion of thinking" as used by SPD politicians Bahr and Ehmke, and wondered: "Is it not a perversion of thinking not to investigate a defensive system that cannot be used offensively?"

The CSU politician had the following to say about the "moral aspect" of the SDI: "I am puzzled by the attitude of some politicians and moralists in our country. At the

height of the counterarmament debate some 2 years ago, they said that the balance of terror strategy was one that would not last long and that was morally unjustified over longer periods of time. Now these same people are demanding that we not participate in SDI, but that the continuation of this balance of terror be guaranteed."

Waigel said: "A defensive system something like what the SDI research is aiming for has the chance of making an attack impossible or at least very unlikely. Viewed from the angle of political ideas and of the moral aspect, this would be closer to our concept of creating peace with fewer weapons than any other existing system."

However, we must "realize there will be effects in the field of conventional defense," Waigel said. The followers of the "peace movement" and of the SPD have repeatedly said that if nuclear potential is decreased, they would accept more conventional defense capacity, he said. "Now there is the theoretical possibility of reducing the nuclear potential, and new reservations are being expressed. I believe that the SDI provides the opportunity to put deadly offensive weapons in their place for the first time and to move toward a new way of thinking about military policy."

On the unresolved question of how Europe could be integrated within the protection of the SDI system, Waigel mentioned different conditions resulting from the "different warning times." "After all, minutes are involved with long-range missiles, while only seconds are involved with short-range missiles." He said that according to scientists and military strategists, there is a possibility "of also setting up such a defensive system against short-range missiles." However, this will happen only if the Europeans participate in the research work, Waigel said. "If they do not participate, it will be hard to make a superpower include from the very beginning the interests of those who are against such a project."

After a "basic yes" to cooperation in research, conditions must be negotiated with the United States, Waigel noted. He sees "good prospects" in this connection for German firms. "However, we must first say yes, and then we can attend to more detailed conditions," he concluded.

Deputies Ehmke, Ruehe Respond

DW110855 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1945 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Interview with Horst Ehmke, SPD deputy floor leader in the Bundestag, and Volker Ruehe, CDU/CSU Bundestag faction spokesman on security policy, by program moderator Ruprecht Eser; from the "Heute-Journal" program; live by direct line to Bonn and Hamburg, respectively]

[Text] [Eser] Mr Ruehe, should we follow the demand just raised by Theo Waigel, head of the CSU land group in the Bundestag, and first say yes with regard to participation in the research program and then negotiate on the conditions or must the conditions be clear first before we say yes?

[Ruehe] Mr Eser, a categorical no to participation in research, as demanded by the SPD, would banish us from the game. A premature yes where enthusiasm substitutes for examination would prevent us from looking after the German interests. For this reason it is appropriate to say—as the Federal Government has done—that we are interested in principle in cooperating in research, but we must now

discuss conditions quite concretely so that this will become a matter of mutual advantage, a technology transfer between Europe and the United States.

[Ester] Mr Ehmke, why the categorical no of the SPD, and how do you justify it?

[Ehmke] To begin with I believe that the CDU as well as Mr Ruehe pose the question erroneously. The question is: Do we want to participate in the SDI program, a program for the militarization of outer space? In my opinion, as far as the Federal Republic and Europe are concerned, the answer can only be no because this program will entail another arms race and jeopardize the Geneva negotiations. The research aspect must be completely separated from this program. There are fields of basic research and these are the only ones involved in the U.S. offer, in which cooperation and extended cooperation can be sensible. This can be done in the civilian sector. Really, we would be out of our minds if we were to offer cooperation by science and industry of the Federal Republic and of Europe under unfavorable conditions, namely, first military secrecy, second U.S. control, and third potential conflicts with the ABM treaty which particularly prohibits technology transfer in this field.

[Eser] These are quite a few arguments, Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] True, but I feel that the Social Democrats already gave a wrong answer to the first question, which is whether it is alright for the Americans to engage in research on the setup of a space defense system. As you very well know, Mr Ehmke, the situation we face in this area is that the Soviets are doing research, and since the Americans cannot prevent that they, themselves must engage in such research. We would indeed enhance our influence if we cooperate in this effort. But my argument is not to say yes unconditionally but to make sure that there will really be a technology transfer in partnership—seeing as this has not always developed in a positive way in the past. The whole thing is not a sort of seasonal sale where you make a quick buy without looking at the merchandise, and therefore we will not allow anybody to put us under time pressure.

[Eser] Very briefly in conclusion, gentlemen: Mr Ehmke, can you say what concrete alternatives the SPD has to offer to the existing proposal?

[Ehmke] A joint European counteroffer to the Americans for cooperation in specifically defined research fields outside the military restrictions.

[Eser] And Mr Ruehe, you said: no enthusiasm. And you voiced the expectation that the Americans will give concrete answers to concrete questions. What are the concrete questions beyond the technology transfer which the Federal Government still considers unanswered?

[Ruehe] It must be to mutual advantage, and it must transpire within the framework of the East-West treaties. What I mean to say is that the so-called ABM treaty on defense systems must be observed. I would like to repeat that we must also do research in the military sector because it is necessary to ensure the same protection in Europe as in the United States. For this reason it would be fundamentally wrong to stay aloof.

[Eser] Thank you very much in Bonn and in Hamburg.

FDP's Feldmann, Solms Comment

DW110943 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11 Apr 85 p 1

[DDP report: "FDP Disarmament Expert Contradicts Waigel's SDI Thesis"]

[Text] Bonn, (DDP) -- FDP Bundestag deputy and disarmament expert Feldmann rejected the statement of Waigel, the chief of the CSU land group representation in Bonn, who said that German participation in the U.S. SDI to investigate possible defense systems in space is imperative if the FRG wants to continue to be among the first in technology. Feldmann emphasized that possible German participation can be examined only from security-policy points of view. To technological challenges a technological answer must be given and not a military one that would promise only technological waste products, he said. A decision cannot be imperative as long as the necessary coordination processes have not been concluded, he added.

Solms, the deputy chairman of the GDP Bundestag faction, warned the German industry against being "allured" by the argument of a "technology thrust" into participation in the SDI research program. The high standard of German research and technology must not necessitate fear of becoming uncoupled from world standards if participation in the SDI was renounced, he said.

FRG'S STRAUSS URGES PARTICIPATION IN SDI PROGRAM

DW041003 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1945 GMT 3 Apr 85

[Interview with Franz Josef Strauss, CSU chairman and Bavarian minister president, by correspondent Gerd Kemming in Munich; date not given--recorded]

[Text] [Kemming] Mr Minister President, why do you recommend the SDI research program? Is it primarily for strategic-military reasons or are you afraid that the FRG might end up taking a back seat economically?

[Strauss] I advocate the program for three reasons. For quite some time the whole world has been calling for an alternative to nuclear deterrence. And when such an alternative is presented people react only with reservations, doubts, and objections. What are the other alternatives? Unilateral disarmament means capitulation; war is criminal madness; a change in Soviet attitude cannot be expected for the foreseeable future. Hence, nuclear deterrence — or what?

This is one reason. The other is the political harmony in NATO between the European and American pillars of NATO, which in the event of a European failure would be seriously jeopardized. The third is the scientific-technical future. The Americans are rushing into the 21st century now, and the Europeans just stand at the race track and step on each others toes.

[Kemming] Are you afraid that the Americans might ask for our financial support and later possibly withhold the research results from us?

[Strauss] One should definitely not begin with all sorts of doubts and reservations, one should begin with a yes and not with any buts. If we decide to participate we will also raise our claims. Besides, people should not distrust so much the science and technology of our country. We have great, capable people; we have highly modern facilities in this field. We will indeed put in our two cents' worth. Let us not indulge in any inferiority complexes.

[Kemming] At the moment the Federal Government is not united. What do you think about that?

[Strauss] What this involves is a policy guideline. It just will not do to have the state secretary in the Foreign Office say this and his minister come out with a similar version -- perhaps one or the other is the ventriloquist, to put it humorously -- while the defense minister makes a gallant statement only to be discredited or contradicted again. The chancellor must at long last state clearly and unequivocally what he wants. There is just one thing to say: Yes or no; and for us there is only this to say: yes.

FRG BUNDESWEHR WHITE PAPER WELCOMES SDI RESEARCH

LD011627 Hamburg DPA in German 1504 GMT 1 Apr 85

[Excerpts] Bonn, 1 Apr (DPA)--According to information from the Federal Government, the Soviet Union has had at its disposal a system which can destroy satellites in space since the early seventies. The Bundeswehr 1985 white paper says, according to DPA information, that Moscow started to use space increasingly for military means 15 years ago. The Soviets were driving their missile defense capability forward in four areas. The white paper will be discussed by the Cabinet in mid-April and is to be presented to Parliament before the summer break.

According to the 650-page white paper, the Soviets continue to expand their missile defense system around Moscow. They tested new mobile defense missiles which are able to intercept American strategic missiles. Over and above this, Moscow conducted intensive research into laser and particle weapons. The United States proved that the Soviet Union already constructed such weapons systems as prototypes. The Warsaw pact consistently improved its attack options over the past years. This alliance steadily increased the numerical superiority of its armed forces and also the equality of its weapons. The research into the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] system by the United States is expressly welcomed.

The Federal Government is determined to make great efforts not only to preserve, but to increase the fighting strength and combat readiness of the Bundeswehr for the fulfillment of its alliance obligations. The armed forces of the East are prepared for fast and broad-front offensives. In land forces, 22 NATO divisions would be faced by approximately 61 Warsaw pact divisions at the start of a conflict in central Europe. As for air forces, a Soviet offensive of approximately 2,700 fighters is available. The Eastern naval forces are vastly superior to NATO, particularly in the Baltic.

FRG'S WOERNER INTERVIEWED ON SDI PARTICIPATION

DW291225 Cologne Duetsche Welle International Service in German 1015 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by correspondent Fechner; date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Fechner] You were extremely satisfied with the course of the Luxembourg meeting. What made you so satisfied?

[Woerner] The first reason, which is also the most important one as far as I am concerned, is that we succeeded in arranging the unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons in such a way that an old desire of the Germans was met: Away with the nuclear demolition munitions, meaning the so-called nuclear mines. In other respects, too, the reduction has been devised in such a way that short-range systems will be reduced. The second reason is that we arrived at a uniform assessment of the U.S. research efforts in the field of antimissile defense, which I consider progress in this alliance and which probably will strengthen the negotiating position of the Americans.

[Fechner] But the reductions envisaged for the nuclear potential will entail a weakening of the defense potential. Has any substitute for them been envisaged in the conventional field?

[Woerner] I would not call it a weakening of the defense potential. We have gone down to the lowest level of what is necessary for preventing war, for deterrence, and therefore also for safeguarding stability and peace. But it goes without saying that this nuclear potential will be able to provide credible deterrence only if it is accompanied by greater conventional efforts.

[Fechner] You stressed the alliance's unanimity with respect to the research on the space defense system. Is there any particular reason why you point out time and again that this merely involves research?

[Woerner] Yes, because at the moment no one, either American or European, can tell whether the results of that research will allow the deployment of such systems. Even the technological problems have not as yet been clarified, and beyond that there are a number of strategic and political questions which first must be thoroughly pondered and discussed before deciding yes or no on deployment. Besides, the whole thing must be viewed in terms of time phases of at least, 5, 8, or even 10 years; so there is no time pressure whatsover here.

[Fechner] Will you recommend that the Federal Government accept the invitation extended by Weinberger?

[Woerner] The chancellor gave clear criteria in Munich which I deem appropriate and which, I believe, will be applied. The whole matter will not be decided on the basis of my advice, but in a conference of the Federal Government as a body, and I do not wish to anticipate that decision.

FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS, SPD'S EHMKE ON SDI

LD140958 Hamburg DPA in German 2306 GMT 13 Apr 85

[Text] Frankfurt 13 Apr (DPA) — According to the state secretary at the FRG Defense Ministry, Lothar Ruehl, a concrete reply from Bonn to the American inquiry regarding participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program will take months. Speaking on the Hesse radio program "Frankfurt Discussion," Ruehl said on Sunday that it must first be discussed under what circumstances the West European states could be protected by the SDI. However, one must not overlook that the program would give an enormous investment boost to technology.

This was denied by the deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Horst Ehmke. In Ehmke's view there is the danger that the scientific exchange between the United States and West Europe will be further restricted.

There have been negative experiences with the Americans on the exchange of technology. In the case of the SDI program, it must be expected that Washington would want to profit from West European technology but would declare their own discoveries to be military secrets and not pass them on to the Europeans.

ITALIAN MINISTER SPADOLINI DISCUSSES EUROPEAN ROLE IN SDI

PM121820 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 Apr 85 p 8

[Interview with Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini by Vladimiro Odinzov in Rome; date not given]

[Excerpt] Rome -- [Odinzov] Minister, Italy, together with the other Western countries, has been invited to take part in the research into the SDI space defense project. What assessments will influence our government's decisions and answers?

[Spadolini] I had already discussed the question of space weapons at length with U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in Washington in January. I consider the letter that Weinberger gave me and all the ministers of the other alliance countries in Luxembourg a shrewd political move (apart from the formats and the 60-day deadline, which are entirely unacceptable: I told Weinberger so right away). It is shrewd because it is based on a dialogue with Europe (and obviously a dialogue rules out a "take it or Leave it" approach), because it initiates a discussion between the two sides of the Atlantic about the research project, its format, its scope, and its distant objectives, and its immediate aims.

Over the past 40 years the West's security and the guarantee of the postwar order have been based on the principle that the defense of our nations is indivisible — within an admittedly unbalanced and contradictory U.S.—European rapport in which a divided Europe has put the heaviest burden on its transatlantic partner. Space research could lead, perhaps in the distant future, to a new system of defense: It even challenges the nuclear weapon. It is a scenario that must see a joint involvement of the two mainstays of the Atlantic alliance, in ways and formats yet to be defined. Without the United States, Europe now lacks the means to ensure its own defense. But without Europe, the United States loses its very identity and role as a leading nation.

So the answer that the Italian Government will give to the U.S. initiative — not without the necessary contacts with the political forces and with a possible parliamentary debate — will be based on these initial considerations. It is in nobody's interests on either side of the Atlantic to split the alliance. Especially over a research plan — and one which so far lacks any operational aspects.

[Odinzov] It is being said that the European response to the U.S. proposals must be united. Will the decision be dictated by political or by military considerations?

[Spadolini] Do we really want the United States to go it alone along the path of research? Of course it has both the means and the will to do so. But I perceive a

political need to involve the allies. Europe must assert this political need. It must bring it to bear, because it now represents its best card in its relations with Washington. Otherwise, how could the Europeans make their voice heard if and when, after the research phase, an examination is made of the new defense systems' practical applications? Weinberger spoke to me in terms of the early years of the new millenium for the complete deployment of those defense systems. That will mean the opening of a new political chapter full of diplomatic implications, partly in connection with negotiations with the Soviet Union. Europe cannot be excluded from this political phase.

[Odinzov] The need for Western solidarity has always prevailed over occasional differences between the two sides of the Atlantic. Could Europe make its own voice heard on this occasion?

[Spadolini] Europe's voice must now stress one aspect above all. The research program must take place within the confines of the 1972 ABM treaty. I would add another point which I consider very important, as I stressed at the NATO meeting in Luxembourg. Europe already has the means of expressing a united line. The WEU is the suitable forum for carrying out joint deliberations among the European governments.

[Odinzov] Europe seems worried about a militarization of space. Do you believe that, if the economic and military technological research makes the SDI possible, it would be impossible to arrest this new arms race?

[Spadolini] We are combating all arms races — and this is nothing new. Both in the conventional and in the nuclear fields. We are for full observance of international accords and treaties. What is more, we hope for new understandings between the superpowers that will create stronger ties and lower the danger threshold. But we have no power to halt the course of scientific research. Not in any field — even weapons. Especially when, for the first time in mankind's history, the specific possibility of limiting the destructive potential of the nuclear weapon is emerging (the Americans are certainly influenced by the Hiroshima bomb complex — especially, I would say, President Reagan, who is, after all, the consistent spokesman for a pioneering America.)

Is this idealistic? Does it imply an underestimation of the vast economic and political costs of such an objective? Nobody can yet say. We are just at the start of a complex program. It is up to us to prevent the transition from the research phase to a subsequent phase characterized by another devastating arms race — this time in space.

This is why it is necessary to stress right away the commitment to maintain a cooperative approach to the USSR with regard to the practical utilization of future results of the research.

[Odinzov] The SDI is a central issue in the Geneva negotiations, and there is every likelihood that the Soviet Union intends to play that card. But what would happen if the United States were to reject the Soviet offer of a substantial reduction of existing strategic and Eurostrategic systems in exchange for a U.S. abandonment of the SDI?

[Spadolini] At the moment no such offer exists. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact's missile buildup program has been continuing at a worrying rate. If and when there are signs of an accord on achieving a balance of security at a lower level than now, we will be able to assess it. It would be a disastrous mistake to forego an accord to reduce the nuclear threat in real, not just propagandist, terms.

[Odinzov] Minister, apart from the immediate military and strategic aims, the U.S. plans reflect the attractive hypothesis of being able to replace the present deterrent

based on MAD with a "mutual assured security" based precisely on a space shield. Is such a philosophy tenable, albeit in the distant future?

[Spadolini] I agree: It is an attractive hypothesis. Is it possible too? Many authoritative U.S. experts have stressed the infeasibility of the space shield. I believe that the research must answer this question too. We cannot reject any hypothesis at the outset.

A doctrine based on "mutual assured security," within which the bond between Europe and the United States with regard to joint defense is strengthened, is a prospect that could change the face of the world.

On one condition, however — that the Soviets too have their own shield. The real challenge of the future will be that of peace and cooperation. Nobody must think of achieving a kind of final strategic superiority over his adversary by means of space weapons. It is necessary to study, analyze, and work with a view to creating the conditions for a more secure world with a more stable balance of security.

NETHERLANDS LP LEADER CONDEMNS U.S. STAR WAR 'PRESSURE'

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 28 Mar 85 pp 1-2

[Text] Amsterdam, March 27--Dutch Labour Party leader Joop den Uyl today accused the United States of putting its allies under pressure to accept the Reagan administration's controversial 'Star Wars' space defence plan.

Den Uyl was commenting on a formal offer from Washington to its NATO allies plus Australia, Israel and Japan to join in a research programme for a space-based defence system against nuclear missiles.

The invitation was issued yesterday by U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Luxembourg.

Den Uyl was speaking on his return from a two-day visit to Washington as a member of a delegation from the Socialist International.

The delegation met Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Richard Burt and former U.S. arms negotiator Paul Nitze.

Moscow Visit

Den Uyl said the delegation had argued that unless the U.S.-Soviet arms talks in Geneva produce agreement on some point in the short term then all optimism about their outcome will quickly fade.

The delegation also discussed the effect of the Star Wars plans and production of the MX intercontinental missile on superpower relations.

Administration members showed great interest in a visit which the delegation made to Moscow last week, without Den Uyl, and which included a meeting with Community party leader Mikhail Gorbachev [as published], Den Uyl said.

Den Uyl said the United States was undoubtedly willing to make a goodwill gesture towards the Soviet Union such as a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev.

Members of the delegation who visited Moscow said they felt the Soviets also favoured such a meeting, Den Uyl said, adding that he believed this would be "useful."

The veteran opposition leader described the invitation as a ploy by the United States to ease criticism of the Star Wars programme by offering its allies a share of the lucrative research.

Governments would feel compelled to take part in research on economic grounds without evaluating the political aims of the United States, he said.

'Lesser Evil'

In an allusion to earlier remarks by President Reagan that he would be prepared to share Star Wars technology with the Soviet Union, Den Uyl asked why the invitation had not been sent to Moscow.

He said he believed development of space-based defensive weapons would prove impractical and could trigger off deployment of new offensive weapons.

The Labour leader said joint U.S.-Soviet development of a space-based antimissile defence would be a "lesser evil" than a one-sided western programme.

NATO members would soon have to take a stand on the Star Wars issue and this could lead to divisions within the alliance, he said.

DANISH FOLKETING FAILS TO REACH ACCORD ON 'STAR WARS'

PMO71349 Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 27 Mar 85 p 21

[Report by Jens J. Krogh: "Clear Danish 'No' to Star Wars"]

[Text] An attempt yesterday to reach broad Danish agreement on an approach to the U.S. "star wars" project prior to the debate on the subject in the Folketing failed because of opposition from the Liberal Party. This was the second time in the present Folketing session that the opposition of the Liberal Party alone to a Social Democratic motion prevented broad Danish agreement on security policy.

Conservative Folketing group chairman Knud Ostergaard, who is also chairman of the Folketing's Dyvig committee, held talks with the opposition on the government parties' behalf to reach a "compromise motion" which all sides would be able to accept. The objective was to create calm surrounding security policy while the Dyvig committee is at work. However, all the draft motions which Knud Ostergaard took back to the government parties were rejected by the Liberal Party and to some extent by the Center Democrats.

Instead, the alternative majority in the Folketing passed a Social Democratic motion which states that Denmark is opposed to the deployment of weapons in space and participation in their research and development. The motion also states that Denmark supports the preservation and maintenance of the so-called ABM treaty which forbids the production of antiballistic missiles. The motion also supports a new treaty between East and West preventing the militarization of space.

The motion was passed with the votes of the Social Democratic Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the Socialist People's Party, and the Left Socialist Party. All the other Folketing deputies voted against the motion.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) described sections of the motion as lifted from "the Soviet empty phrase factory."

"It is completely one-sided," Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said.

Social Democratic Chairman Anker Jorgensen considers that as a result of the government's attitude a very unfortunate parliamentary situation has again arisen. "The government parties are seemingly more loyal to the king than the king himself. It is well known that many NATO politicians and NATO countries are opposed to the 'star wars' project.

It is as if it is the government's view that little by little we must get used to these plans," Anker Jorgensen said. During the debate he called in vain on Prime Minister Poul Schlueter to state the government's attitude to the serious parliamentary situation which has again arisen when the government is in obvious conflict with the Folketing majority. However, there are indications that many nonsocialist politicians are in agreement with the majority. The only spokesman from the government parties who saw anything positive in the "star wars" plans came from the Liberals.

"Would it not be correct to back the ideas put forward by President Reagan in which instead of mutual destruction through nuclear arms greater mutual security is achieved?" the Liberals' Ivar Hansen said.

A totally new development is that government politicians led by Poul Schlueter and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen are now calling the "star wars" plans "space defenses."

DANISH, GDR OFFICIALS DISCUSS SDI

AU121818 Paris AFP in English 1814 GMT 12 Apr 85

[Text] Copenhagen, April 12 (AFP) -- East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer left here today for East Berlin after a three-day official visit. Informed sources said Mr Fischer and his Danish counterpart Uffe Ellemann-Gensen appeared to agree on the need to make progress in disarmament efforts. A Danish statement on the talks between the two men said Mr Elemann-Jensen had expressed his "strong concern" over the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI] known as "star wars." The importance of the U.S.-Soviet arms talks in Geneva and the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament and Security in Europe were underlined in the talks.

Two agreements were signed, one to simplify customs formalities for road transport between the two countries and the other on veterinary cooperation. Mr Ellemann-Jensen called for a better trade balance between East Germany and Denmark, whose trade deficit with the East Germans is about 12 million dollars.

cso: 5200/2573

NORWAY'S FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTS CHARGE ON 'STAR WARS'

PM011046 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo: "Clear Stance Against Space Weapons"]

[Text] "The suggestion that there is anything unclear about the government's attitude to space weapons and an arms race in space must be firmly rejected. At the United Nations and in the UN Disarmament Committee our country has worked actively for measures against space weapons," Foreign Minister Svenn Stray said in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN. It was over the weekend that Labor Party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland accused the government of being unclear -- an accusation partially followed up by Christian People's Party parliamentary leader Harald Synnes and Center Party parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl. The matter was discussed yesterday at the regular government conference. Last Friday [22 February], at the request of the Labor Party, Foreign Minister Svenn Stray briefed the extended foreign affairs committee on the government's attitude to space weapons. Such briefings are confidential, but over the weekend politicians who were present and others have commented on the meeting. Foreign Minister Stray rejected the accusation that the government's stance on this issue is unclear and gave the reminder that Prime Minister Kare Willoch expressed Norway's attitude in his speech to the UN General Assembly last fall. Willoch said the following, for example:

"In our vision of a safer and more stable world there is no room for the militarization of space. This should be prevented through both bilateral and multilateral measures. For this reason we call for an agreement to hold talks to find a foundation for arms control and disarmament in space."

The foreign minister also recalled that in NATO recently Norway has demonstrated the same approach and that at a NATO meeting Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Torjborn Froysnes said that it is important to make use of the Geneva negotiations to prevent uncontrolled arms developments in space. Froysnes also said that the Norwegian view is that such an arms race in space must be avoided at all costs. Foreign Minister Stray said that the undersecretary's statements are completely in line with what the Foreign Affairs Committee stressed in its recommendations on the government's disarmament report. In the light of this Stray said that the assertion that the government's behavior conflicts with the recommendations on the disarmament report is without foundation. He pointed out that the government has always acted in agreement with the recommendations, for the simple reason that the government takes the same view.

[Svabo] Do you have any comment on Harald Synnes' (Christian People's Party) accusation that the government is not being clear?

[Stray] His remarks are probably based on a misleading account of what was said at a closed session of the extended Foreign Affairs Committee at which Synnes himself was not present.

[Svabo] Do you think that the Labor Party wants to use space weapons to create a situation in the Storting reminiscent of the split which existed on the so-called missile issue?

[Stray] It is obvious to assume that this is the case.

[Svabo] What will be the next developments on this issue?

[Stray] In the government's view the main point is that the question of space arms is now being included in the Geneva talks. The important thing here is that through these negotiations it might be possible to bring about a substantial reduction in offensive nuclear weapons and intercontinental and medium-range missiles and a ban on arms in space.

The United States has said that it is willing to discuss the agenda for and the development in these negotiations with its allies. The government is concerned first and foremost in this context with how Norway can make a contribution so that the negotiations will bring the results we all want.

cso: 5200/2539

NORWAY'S DEFENSE MINISTER THINKS SPACE WEAPONS RESEARCH UNLIKELY

PM101102 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Mar 85 p 3

[Report by Morten Malmo: "Space Weapons Research Without Norway"]

[Text] "As a first reaction I have said that even though it could have been interesting from the research point of view to take part, it will be political assessments which will be decisive for the government. For my own part I assume that the question of Norway's participation in space defense research will not arise," Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad said in the Storting yesterday.

The Socialist Left Party's Stein Ornhoi raised the space weapons issue at the end of the Storting's morning session yesterday. He directed attention to the communique made public after the meeting of defense ministers within the framework of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group held in Luxembourg on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. Ornhoi said that the communique shows that Norway has lent its support to the U.S. space weapons research probram. Ornhoi also said: "The communique welcomes the invitation to cooperation in this madness."

In his reply to Ornhoi, Sjaastad said of the published communique: "If the communique is viewed as a whole it does not contain any unreserved support for the U.S. space weapons research program, nor has Norway been party to any unconditional declaration of support." Of the invitation U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has made offering participation in the research program, Sjaastad said that this has not been studied in detail by the government. Sjaastad also added that it is his personal view that the question of Norwegian involvement in this type of research will not arise.

Ornhoi said that in his view the NATO communique showed that Norway and the other NATO nations support the U.S. space weapons research program. The Christian People's Party and Center Party parliamentary leaders, Harald Synnes and Johan Buttedahl, made no mention of the communique but noted the minister's statement. However, Buttedahl said that it has been noted that within NATO Norway has expressed the concern which many people feel about the development of space weapons.

Storting Defense Committee chairman Knut Frydenlund (Labor Party) said that at the NATO meeting Norway should have delivered such strong warnings against the U.S. plans that this would have "rubbed off" on the drafting of the communique. Frydenlund also said that — in strictly formal terms — the government should have raised the matter with the Storting, but Frydenlund also gave the reminder that the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee has a space weapons proposal on its agenda.

NORWEGIAN ARBEIDERBLADET RAPS GOVERNMENT STANCE ON SDI

PMO11413 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 28 Mar 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Insanity's Spiral"]

[Text] The government's position on the U.S. research program for the development of "star wars weapons" was described as follows by Foreign Minister Svenn Stray in yesterday's DAGBLADET: "We say that we have considered ourselves unable to dissuade the United States from researching into these weapons systems." According to Stray, this is supposed to be a more restrictive view than that expressed by Britain.

Restrictive? When the government makes no attempt to dissuade the United States from the research program this means for the United States and for everyone else that the Norwegian Government is giving its backing to it. While British Foreign Secretary Howe has raised a number of questions regarding the wisdom of the overall "star wars" thinking, you have to search hard to find objections inside the Norwegian Government. The Willoch government, with the Christian People's Party and the Center Party riding on its coattails, is backing a research program which will require enormous economic resources and which — once it is properly under way — will create its own premises and logic so that it will be impossible to halt before we find ourselves caught up in an insane new arms spiral.

cso: 5200/2573

NORWAY'S STRAY COMMENTS ON OPPOSITION TO SPACE WEAPONS

PM281027 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Feb 85 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Government Opposes 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] The Norwegian Government takes the view that space weapons must be discussed in the negotiations which begin in Geneva 12 March between the United States and the Soviet Union. The negotiations on missile armaments and space weapons must be viewed together, runs the Norwegian view. Norway has made this clear, Foreign Minister Svenn Stray said at a meeting of the Storting Extended Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday. He pointed out that the government considers it important that agreement be reached on the nondeployment of space weapons.

According to information received by AFTEN POSTEN there has been a strong desire on the part of the Norwegian Labor Party to use the space weapons issue as a new "missile issue" with the aim of driving a wedge between the government parties and causing renegades to break away from the parties of the center. After yesterday's meeting there is little reason to expect any dramatic developments in this direction. It was pointed out, for example, that in its present stage the project merely involves research and not deployment and that is primarily the business of the United States and not of NATO.

Labor Party leader GRO Harlem Brundtland told NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA that the party wants to give forceful warnings against the militarization of space, and she referred to a unanimous recommendation from the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee last spring.

Stein Orhnoi (Socialist Left Party) said that his party wants the matter raised in the Storting as soon as possible.

In his report to the Extended Foreign Affairs Committee Stray said that in the government's view it is particularly important to reach agreement that weapons systems for use in space are not deployed. He also said that the research program initiated by the United States does not conflict with any arms control agreements already reached.

The Americans have given assurances that if a step beyond the research stage is likely this will only happen after negotiations with the Soviet Union. Only early in the 1990's will research have progressed far enough for the U.S. President to be able to reach a decision on the possible development of defense systems in space, Stray said.

In consultations between the allies Norway has stressed that the research cannot take forms which could create the impression that one side is seeking military superiority. Stray said that one cannot expect the United States to impose limitations on the possible future development of U.S. weapons systems without the Soviet Union also being willing to accept reductions in arms categories where the country today has an advantage.

cso: 5200/2539

NORWEGIAN PAPER: AGREEMENT ON SPACE ARMS BAN NEEDED

PM281649 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Space Weapons"]

[Text] Would it be correct of the U.S. allies to go against the planned U.S. research program on space weapons? This is a question about which the countries in Western Europe, including Norway, are busy making up their minds. To begin with, very few of us feel any particular need to have more types of weapons deployed around than are already in existence. Norway has already made it clear, through Prime Minister Willoch at the United Nations, for example, that our government is opposed to the militarization of space. But researching a possible space weapon is not the same as producing one, not to mention using it, even though many people will reasonably enough fear that the one could easily lead to the other.

At the same time we must not close our eyes to the fact that the Soviet Union has long been engaged in comprehensive research into military activities in space. The Soviets are now in the process of carrying out improvements in their own ABM defense systems. President Reagan's plans for a defense system in space against offensive missiles can therefore be seen as a countermove to the Soviet Union's programs.

In addition, Reagan has his own vision of space weapons. He sees them as a possible way of making nuclear arms obsolete, in that they will be able to destroy nuclear missiles on their way to their targets in a war situation. Opinion is divided on this attractive future prospect among Americans, too. Many people take the view that a defensive space weapon as Reagan imagines it cannot be all-embracing enough to halt all enemy nuclear missiles.

Regardless of whether such objections are well founded, we are forced to conclude that a ban on research in this field would be futile, for the simple reason that it would be impossible to verify. It would not even be possible to distinguish between military and civilian research. As far as verification is concerned, there is an abyss of imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In open U.S. society such research programs become public knowledge—if not before, then at least from the moment the President has to ask Congress for the money. In the Soviet Union activities are effectively shrouded in secrecy and silence on all levels.

There is no point in demanding that the United States move to a unilateral research ban while the Soviets calmly continue their research. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the two superpowers now have a unique chance to reach agreement on mutual limitations before a new weapon system has been developed. They should not allow this chance to slip away from them. They can seize it soon at their arms talks in Geneva as part of a more comprehensive agreement on strength reductions where other weapon types are also included.

If, contrary to expectation, the Americans impose on themselves a ban on all research in this field, it is hardly likely to lead to anything other than an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favor. It would be better to make every effort to see to it that effective and mutual agreements are reached in time. Then there could perhaps be the hope that a type of weapon that we distrust will remain absent from tomorrow's world.

BRIEFS

FRG'S SPD OFFICIAL WANTS SDI DISCUSSION--Bonn 2 Apr (DPA)--In the opinion of Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary party, the Bundestag ought to deal as soon as possible with the U.S. SDI. Ehmke said today that in the discussion on European participation in the SDI, an issue of central importance is involved for Europeans. It will be provided here whether West Europe is in a position to look after its own interests within the alliance. Ehmke stated that the SPD delegation, which took part in the German-U.S. Atlantic bridge conference in Dallas, following these talks considers itself confirmed its view that Europeans should not participate in the military program, but should "decide" on issues of basic research in the civil research sphere. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1259 GMT 2 Apr 85]

SALT/START ISSUES

SWEDISH PAPER QUESTIONS REAGAN'S MX VICTORY

PM271541 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Reagan Still Winning Victories"]

[Text] Ronald Reagan's mighty powers of persuasion are still working. With unfortunately clearer figures than expected he induced the U.S. Senate in an important first vote to approve the production of a new consignment of 21 MX missiles; in the past money has been allocated for the production of a similar number.

The decision has been widely reported since it covers the one weapon which, more than any other, has become a symbol of the President's controversial arms program. The MX, the "Peace-keeper" as Reagan calls it, is a large missile by U.S. standards, capable of launching and accurately delivering 10 nuclear warheads against enemy targets. The missile can best be compared with the heavy Soviet missiles which Reagan and his men call "destabilizing" and which he wants to eliminate. These are vulnerable delivery systems which with every launch could in principle threaten several of the other side's systems.

Within the Senate there is strong opposition to this expensive arms system -- according to Reagan administration plans the final tally will be 100 missiles. That they will strengthen U.S. security is an illusion.

Many people were expecting that it would be here that the President would suffer his first serious defeat since his reelection last fall — the sign that on the road to his pension he is beginning to lose his ability to control Congress and is becoming a "lame duck." But it is too early to write off Ronald Reagan as a power factor. By pointing out that the U.S. allies have agreed to the deployment on their soil of medium-range missiles — Belgium's decision (ensured first through a vote of confidence) is the most recent of the U.S. successes — and by demanding heavy—handedly that the Senate should not weaken the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva, he again succeeded in getting his way.

It took a lot of effort. And the gains at home for the Reagan administration may have been bought at the cost of an even tougher negotiating climate in Geneva. There is no reason for the White House to celebrate.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

WEST EUROPEAN REACTION TO GORBACHEV MORATORIUM

FRG Leaders Comment

LDO81113 Hamburg DPA in German 1031 GMT 8 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn, 8 Apr (DPA) — The Federal Government has not commented directly on Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement not to deploy additional medium-range missiles until November, but has once again pointed out the objectives of the Geneva negotiations. Government spokesman Peter Boenisch said in Bonn on Sunday that the Western negotiations in Geneva seek to halt or reverse the missile deployment. It is now up to the Soviet Union to show whether it is prepared to help bring about such a goal.

Pointing out that the United States and Soviet Union have agreed upon confidentiality for the Geneva negotiations, Boenisch emphasized that "we shall therefore not comment publicly on the details of negotiating proposals of either side."

FDP disarmament expert Olaf Feldmann has welcomed Gorbachev's announcement as a first sign for a possible improvement in the East-West climate which may benefit the Geneva disarmament talks. Feldmann simultaneously warned, however, to not attach too much importance to the halt in limited deployment as a Soviet concession. The excessive number of Soviet medium-range missiles had already been totally unjustified in the past.

The FDP deputy said this halt in deployment has been long overdue. There is also no justification for resuming it in November. The good behavior clause contained in Gorbachev's proposal is also unacceptable for this West. Feldmann called on Moscow to supply proof at the Geneva negotiating table of its announcements and initiatives which it disseminates as a public appeal.

CDU/CSU: 'Totally Unacceptable'

LD080808 Hamburg DPA in German 0714 GMT 8 Apr 85

[Text] Hamburg, 8 Apr (DPA)—The CDU/CSU considers a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe "totally unacceptable." It would bring advantages only to the Soviet Union, Juergen Todenhoefer, disarmament spokesman for the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag, told DPA today. He was reacting to Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement that the USSR will deploy no more medium-range missiles until November.

A moratorium would only perpetuate the overwhelming superiority with which the Soviet Union threatens Western Europe and remove all incentives for the USSR to negotiate now in Geneva on genuine disarmament of medium-range missiles, Toden-hoefer emphasized. He also noted that under the new leadership, the Soviet Union had apparently not given up its plan to gain military hegemony over Western Europe.

SPD: 'Important Signal'

LD080854 Hamburg DPA in German 0824 GMT 8 Apr 85

[Text] Hamburg, 8 Apr (DPA) — In contrast to the CDU/CSU, SPD executive spokesman Wolfgang Clement said that Gorbachev's announcement of a moratorium is an "important signal" by the Soviet Union's new man which points in the right direction and which can not be ignored. The SPD appealed to the U.S. Government to examine carefully Gorbachev's offer. This examination should aim for an early agreement on a test and deployment ban for nuclear missiles at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, and the prevention of a militarization of space.

As far as the Federal Government is concerned, Clement expressed the hope that it will urge this on the two superpowers now negotiating in Geneva. The SPD executive spokesman recalled that the SPD asked Moscow and Washington right at the beginning to stop developing new weapon systems and prevent stockpiling yet more arms for deployment while the Geneva negotiations are under way.

FRG Press Views Moratorium, Geneva Talks

DW091103 Cologne Duetschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 9 Apr 85

[From the press review]

[Text] The main subject of today's comment is the proposal of Soviet party chief Gorbachev to freeze the number of intermediate-range missiles in Europe for the time being.

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE writes the following about the Soviet moratorium: As expected by the experts, the new man in the Kremlin turns out to be so flexible, not in the matter but in the tactics, that he can spread the seed of doubt and undecidedness in Western opinion. The West is susceptible to just a smile coming from the East. The fact that after achieving a superiority of more than 400 SS-20 missiles, a small pause as suggested by Gorbachev will not do any harm to the Soviets, is unfortunately not understood by all people. The gesture is only aimed at gaining sympathy in Europe.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes: The proposed moratorium for intermediate-range missiles in Europe is neither new nor attractive. For NATO it means just freezing the existing imbalance to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Therefore, NATO has not accepted Gorbachev's moratorium, but began its rearmament. Gorbachev does not offer much more, but he does not demand that the so far implemented disarmament measures be undone. That is a change of Soviet attitude, but since the resumption of the Geneva negotiations it is not very new either. Yet his offer must be examined, writes the paper.

ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of Mainz maintains: The Soviets are not interested in a deal at the bargaining table, but in a political offensive with which they want to support their negotiations strategy in Geneva.

In doing this, they overlook the fact that the credibility of their offers will not be increased through constant repeats along with simultaneous high armament. In the meantime, more than 1,000 nuclear warheads of the SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe cover all cities and strategic targets there. Moscow's most recent attempt is aimed at the weakest link of the NATO alliance—the Netherlands that has not fulfilled the 1979 decision to deploy 48 cruise missiles—and at breaking it out of the Western defensive front.

NUERNBERGER NACHRICHTEN writes: Reagan and his people do not want to let European disarmament ideas come up at all, and the true reason for the quick rejection is the suspicion that Gorbachev intended to awaken such ideas intentionally. They see subtle planning behind it that the proposal was made during the days of the Easter marches. Such mistrust is also fanned by the limitation of the one-sided Soviet missile deployment halt up to November. In the same month the Netherlands, the last one of the 5 countries to deploy wants to decide whether it will deploy the 48 U.S. cruise missiles. However, if the new Kremlin chief really did not intend anything but splitting the Western alliance, a brusque no would be a blunt weapon. It would be better if Reagan took up Gorbachev's word about the necessary strong impulse on a high level to improve mutual relations, and pressed for a summit meeting.

HESSISCHE/NIEDERSAECHSISCHE ALLGEMEINE of Kassel asks: Could it be that despite all the prejudice and all the justified skepticism, the new master of the Kremlin could have the ambition to make a new beginning to improve East-West relations? Is it not remarkable how Gorbachev with the missile moratorium will make an advance concession until the fall without being certain of getting something in return? The United States can in the meantime continue the deployment of missiles in Europe and lessen the armament lead of the Soviets. It could step up its space plans and develop its negotiating position in Geneva. Gorbachev has certainly calculated this risk and he, naturally, also connects the propagandistic intentions with the halt in armament.

Genscher Opposes Bilateral Deployment Moratorium

LD101519 Hamburg DPA in German 1441 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] Bonn, 10 Apr (DPA) -- Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, talking to the cabinet today, welcomed the interest expressed by CPSU head Mikhail Gorbachev for a constructive organization of Soviet-American relations, in particular the basic readiness for a summit meeting. However, Genscher spoke against a bilateral moratorium by the United States and the USSR on deploying medium-range missiles in Europe. But a unilateral 6-month halt by Moscow in deploying such weapons is better "than continuous deployment," the foreign minister said, according to Government spokesman Peter Boenisch.

A bilateral moratorium, Genscher said, would freeze the USSR's considerable lead in the numbers of medium-range missiles deployed. The foreign minister pointed out that

the Federal Government has repeatedly advocated a U.S.-Soviet summit. They agreed with Gorbachev's view that all states, large and small, contribute to improving the international situation.

For the Geneva negotiations, the Federal Government hopes for balanced results which will lead to a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons and to greater stability. According to Boenisch, the Federal Government appeals to the Soviet Union, through their attitude at the negotiating table, to make possible soon a genuine reduction based on the concrete and verifiable results of negotiations.

Belgian Government Reacts

LD081649 Brussels Domestic Service in French 1600 GMT 8 Apr 85

[Excerpt] The announcement by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev of a moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles has been variously received but often with skepticism in the West. Skepticism has been expressed by the Belgian Government, the reaction of which has just been disclosed by Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans.

The Belgian Government considers that the proposal made by Moscow would have been more appropriately made at the Geneva conference where it could have given rise to counterproposals and serious negotiations.

This reaction is similar to that of the United States. In any case, the Belgian Government is studying Moscow's proposal in concert with its partners in the Atlantic alliance.

Norwegian Reaction

PM120855 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Apr 85 p 8

[Report by Egil Wettre-Johnsen: "Stray: Greater Imbalance"]

[Text] There are differing Norwegian views of how seriously the West should take Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative for a freeze on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles. Most positive in his comments to AFTENPOSTEN was Christian People's Party parliamentary leader Harald Synnes who believes that the vast majority in the West would have felt some hope and happiness if the United States could have responded in a similar manner and halted the Western deployment of medium-range missiles. "There is more than enough deterrence on both sides and they must now begin to take each other at their word. If there is to be any disarmament, people must be willing to halt rearmament," Synnes told AFTENPOSTEN.

Foreign Minister Svenn Stray said that the freeze need not have any significance other than that the Soviet Union has now completed its deployment program. He stressed that it is the view of Norway and NATO that there are too many missiles on the Eastern side and emphasized that the imbalance in the numbers of Eastern and Western medium-range missiles is greater today than when the NATO two track decision was reached in 1979. Labor Party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland told AFTENPOSTEN that in the present situation it is of central importance that movement is achieved in the East-West dialogue in order to break the momentum of the arms race. All chances for positive developments and for a summit in

the near future must be seized. She said that a Soviet deployment freeze must be a better point of departure than continued deployment, and that people on the Western side must not rule out the possibility that there could be something real in such a move. Center Party parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl also stressed to AFTENPOSTEN that the Soviet initiative should be taken seriously by the West. The "No to Nuclear Arms" movement said that Gorbachev's initiative for a halt in the deployment of new medium-range missiles is an interesting move which should not be dismissed without more detailed assessment, NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA reports.

Thatcher Rejects Moratorium

LD081247 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1152 GMT 8 Apr 85

[Article by Chris Moncrieff, PA chief political correspondent, in Singapore]

[Text] The prime minister today poured cold water on the Soviet offer to suspend the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe -- claiming it would "freeze in an enormous superiority of Soviet weapons."

She also spurned the suggestion that Soviet leader Mr Gorbachev made for a moratorium on "star wars" research, something she said was not capable of being checked.

"The essence of any agreement in the armaments sphere is verification. If you cannot have that, there is not a proper basis for trust," Mrs Thatcher said in Singapore.

She told a press conference during her tour of South East Asia: "The freeze which he proposed would of course freeze in an enormous superiority of Soviet weapons in the in the intermediate nuclear range.

"You will recall that before we decided to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles the Soviet Union had steadily deployed over a number of years SS-20s across Europe.

"We said that if she took down the SS-20s there would be no need to deploy any cruise or Pershings."

But Mrs Thatcher continued, the Soviet Union has continued to deploy its missiles.

"Mr Gorbachev and his predecessor continued further to deploy more intermediate range nuclear missiles. The consequence therefore of such a freeze would not be balance, which is what we seek, but enormous Soviet superiority. That, of course, would be unacceptable."

The prime minister said she understood Mr Gorbachev had also suggested a moratorium on "star wars" research.

"The Soviet Union has been doing a good deal of research and it is important that the United States also do research.

"There is no point in having a freeze on research for the very important reason that you cannot verify the amount of research going on," she commented.

She agreed with Mr Gorbachev that the place for talks was the negotiating table at Geneva.

"You cannot have a dialogue through articles in a newspaper, important though the press are," said Mrs Thatcher.

Mr Gorbachev's remarks came in an interview conducted by the Soviet newspaper PRAVDA.

Statement To Be Studied by UK

LD080958 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 0933 GMT 8 Apr 85

[By David Bradshaw, PA political staff]

[Text] Britain today responded cooly to the Soviet announcement of a six-month freeze on its European deployment of nuclear weapons. Ministers believe the announcement is intended to create rifts between the United States and its European allies, and merely freezes an existing Soviet advantage in medium range missiles.

The United States view that there was nothing new in the offer is also shared by the British Government, which is treating Mr Gorbachev's Easter announcement with considerable scepticism. A Foreign Office spokesman said today that the Soviet leader's statement would be studied closely by Britain and its allies. But he added: "However, as we have maintained all along, our purpose is to negotiate a balanced and verifiable agreement to bring about a reduction or complete removal of long-range intermediate nuclear force missiles from Europe.

"Our deployment can be halted or reversed whenever such an agreement warrants this, but the Soviet Union currently has many hundreds of SS-20 warheads targeted on Western Europe and an immediate freeze on Soviet deployment would still leave them with a very heavy imbalance in their favour."

It was pointed out that this was not the first time a moratorium on the deployment of missiles had been proposed by the Soviet Union. Such a move was also announced to stop the initial deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in 1983, but when this went ahead the Soviet Union abandoned its freeze.

The Soviet announcement is seen as a ploy to increase concern in countries about to have cruise and Pershing missiles stationed in them, especially Holland.

FRENCH MINISTRY STATEMENT COMMENTS ON USSR ARMS FREEZE

AB101128 Paris Diplomatic Information Service in French 1042 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Statement by Ministry of External Relations spokesman on 9 April]

[Text] The French Government is carefully examining the Soviet announcement of a 6-month unilateral moratorium on the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It notes, however, that it is precisely the lead taken by the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1983 in the matter of these weapons which led the member countries of the integrated NATO command to first of all try to correct this imbalance through negotiation and, having failed in this attempt, to try to restore a balance of power through the deployment of their own missiles. The Soviet announcement cannot, therefore, serve as a substitute for the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva.

The French Government recalls its constant stand in favor of the search for a lasting balance at the lowest possible level. In this spirit, it noted with satisfaction the proposed meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev.

ITALIAN OFFICIALS COMMENT ON GORBACHEV INITIATIVE

Craxi Sees Desire for Dialogue

AU101538 Rome ANSA in English 1527 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] (ANSA) Venice, April 10 -- NATO countries "substantially" agree on the problem of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations and the starting point can only be that "the current situation tilts in the Soviet Union's favor," Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi said today. Craxi is in Venice for an international conference on innovation and employment.

Yesterday in Madrid, at the Conference of European Community Socialist Parties, Craxi had voiced a favorable reaction to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's decision to freeze deployment of medium-range missiles until November. Craxi had said that the decisions cannot be spurned but carefully examined and that the West should respond with a suitable "counterproposal."

Reporters asked Craxi whether he was taking a different line from the United States, where Gorbachev's decision was initially rejected as a propaganda move, and whether he had consulted President Reagan. In reply Craxi said, "I expressed an assessment of Gorbachev's initiative which is not pessimist and negative. I do not interpret the initiative as a manoeuvre directed at dividing the allies but rather a sign of a desire for dialogue and movement. I hope I'm not wrong."

The Italian prime minister added, "moreover, the Atlantic alliance has already proven its solidity and its compactness and it would be naive to try to provoke divisions with simple tactical moves. We have with difficulty returned to a phase of dialogue and negotiations. No dialogue is possible if we do not give a minimum of credit to the good will of our interlocutors.

"The very fact that we are now facing a new Soviet leadership should advise us to be cautious in (?our) judgements. We are all convinced that it is necessary to create a climate of mutual trust and that the dialogue must be encouraged and nourished.

"There will certainly be a political consultation within the alliance. Italy does not offer mediation but opinions in the spirit of negotiations and search for dialogue."

Andreotti: 'Positive New Feature'

AU110909 Rome ANSA in English 0850 GMT 11 Apr 85

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, April 11 — Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti affirmed the importance of stopping the deployment of medium-range missiles in Eastern Europe without conditioning the freeze on halting the installation of NATO missiles in Western Europe, then cautioned that the moratorium announced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev might represent the consolidation of missile imbalance in Europe in comments on the development last night.

Speaking at the Foreign Press Club in Rome, the foreign minister also noted that: "The positive new feature this year is setting aside the earlier concept of seeing type for type as the balance of force in single armaments."

Andreotti went on to say that it would be much more significant if there had been an announcement of the dismantlement of a "certain number of SS-20's or missiles of the same generation." In this case, he continued, deployment is not only blocked "but the side in great advantage is prepared to take the path towards gradual dismantlement, beginning by dismantling something to reduce imbalance."

With reference to the range of Western responses to Gorbachev's statement on the freeze on the installation of Soviet missiles in Europe until November, the foreign minister recommend a more "thoughtful" approach.

"I envy those chancelleries which half-an-hour later are able to know everything and make a thorough analysis. But if a collection of these analysis is made it is sometimes seen that a pause for meditation would not be out of place. This is not cleverness but a sense of responsibility," he said.

DUTCH BUSINESSMAN, MOSCOW 'OFFICIALS' DISCUSS SS-20'S

PMO11222 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 25 Mar 85 p 3

[Interview with businessman Ernst van Eeghen by Wio Joustra: "The Russians Take the Netherlands' Proposal Seriously"; date not given]

[Excerpts] Heemstede — "I said to the Soviets: What are you going to do now? November 1 is coming ever closer and 48 cruise missiles have the destructive power of 500 Hiroshimas. This could be a beginning for denuclearization. Up to now there has been no success with this. This would be the first time, perhaps a small beginning, but nevertheless..."

Ernst H. Van Eeghen, 64, even interrupts his account sprinkled with English terms to indicate that the Russians are seriously concerned over the still continuing nuclear arms race. "One of my Russian contacts said: The country which fires the first missile is committing murder and suicide."

For the sake of completeness, first the scope of the Netherlands' decision on cruise missiles. On 1 June 1984 there were on the Soviet side 378 SS-20 missiles deployed and targeted on West Europe. If this number has increased by 1 November 1985, the Netherlands will reach an agreement with the United States to deploy 48 cruise missiles in Woensdrecht in 1988. If on 1 November there are the same number or fewer SS-20's, the Netherlands will not deploy. If by this date there is an arms control agreement between the two superpowers in Geneva, the Netherlands will deploy a proportionally smaller number of missiles.

Asked who are the "prominent Russians" with whom he talked last week, Van Eeghen asked the reporter to kindly keep to the real topic, the threat to world peace. He wants to keep his lines to the Supreme Soviet open, and "they would prefer not to be mentioned. They are presidents of institutes, at that sort of level. But this makes little difference for they are all government officials."

[Joustra] On what do you base your statements that in the short term the Soviet authorities are prepared to hold talks with the Netherlands Government on the number of SS-20's deployed in the Soviet Union?

[Van Eeghen] As a nation without satellites we must take as our point of departure the facts provided by the Americans. I told them that if you want to convince us that there are fewer SS-20 missiles, you will have to be able to prove it. It will have to

be made possible for the Netherlands to arrange verification of the figure in some way other than by satellite. That worried them. That has never happened before. Thus they could not reach any decision on that.

Last Wednesday morning Van Eeghen had talks at a higher level — with Leonid Zamyatin, officially the head of the Central Committee's International Information Section, but who, according to the Dutchman, is "the coordinator of Russian foreign policy and the intermediary between the foreign and defense ministers, Gromyko and Sokolov." "We talked for 2 hours and made things clear. He had respect for the Netherlands decision, for the fact that independently of our allies and of Geneva we had adopted a position of our own as a sovereign state. However, verification was a touchy point [last two words in English] for the Soviets immediately conjured up the thought of espionage."

"I said: This is an extremely important matter, and where there is a will there is a way. You must be able to convince the Netherlands Government by permitting another method of inspection, for example, on site or aerial. At the end of our conversation Zamyatin said that he would discuss the matter. Thus I left empty-handed. In the evening immediately before a dinner to which I was invited by the Russians there came via my host (again the reporter was firmly told not to be so curious about his name and position) the telephone message that Zamyatin could agree, provided that on my return to the Netherlands I would declare that I was firmly convinced that the Soviet Union wanted to talk, mark you, not negotiate, in the short term with the Netherlands Government about the number of SS-20's and -- literally -- verification of the same [last four words in English]

"Thus this means that the Russian leaders want to talk. This has been agreed with the Politburo," Van Eeghen did not omit to stress. Today in the Hague he will deliver a report on his talk with Zamyatin to J. Merckelbach, foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Lubbers. "The first opportunity for a real preliminary contact will present itself in the very near future, for shortly the new Russian ambassador to the Netherlands, Blatov, will arrive, and as is customary he will be paying a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Van den Broek."

Last week Van den Broek let his Soviet counterpart, Andrey Gromyko, know that he wants to talk about the medium-range missiles in Europe. "Blatov is a heavyweight; I have heard this from all quarters," Van Eeghen said. "He was Brezhnev's right-hand man and his word also carried great weight with Andropov. My task is now over; the Soviet ambassador must do the remaining work. His instructions will be the same as what I was told; anything else is impossible."

[Joustra] Why should the Soviets choose you to make such an important message known to the world?

[Van Eeghen] I do not know. I know them well. I have the trust of some of their people. The Berkenrode initiative [conference between Netherlands private citizens and Soviet representatives in November 1984] helped. That went down well in Moscow, but in addition I also do not poke my nose into the Soviets' own business.

[Joustra] You make it seems as if the June 1 decision is being taken seriously, while really it was drafted to prevent a crisis in the Christian Democratic Appeal-People's Party for Freedom and Democracy coalition.

[Van Eeghen] Why should the Soviets care how Lubbers reached the decision? What is important to them is that it was approved by the Netherlands Parliament. I have

noticed that the Netherlands proposal is being taken very seriously. And if this is the beginning of denuclearization, then I agree with Lubbers.

[Joustra] How many SS-20's do the Soviets say they now have?

[Van Eeghen] The Soviets say that they have deployed fewer than 378 SS-20's. Look, according to the Russians there are in Western Europe 500 targets worth a hit of 150 kilotons. An SS-20 has three nuclear warheads, each of 150 kilotons. With 378 SS-20's they would therefore have almost 1,200 nuclear warheads, that is more than twice as many as they themselves consider necessary. The different U.S. count of 414 SS-20's is perhaps explained by new launching sites that may have been built, but are intended for the smaller missiles, from the SS-21's to the SS-25's. The Soviets say that the difference is hardly perceptible, certainly not by satellite. They also say that there have never been 378 deployed. That figure could be lower. But how many, then? That you never get to hear. The Soviets naturally refrain from committing themselves.

BELGIAN SOCIAL CHRISTIAN DEFENDS DEPLOYMENT POLICY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 2 Apr 85 pp 1,2

[Commentary by Frank Swaelen, national president of the CVP, in the column "Tribune Libre" (Free Forum): "Negotiate for Peace"]

[Text] The CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] is an advocate of peace, within our country as well as among peoples. This is the reason why our country must be firm in matters of defense, and also be ready to negotiate a balanced and mutual disarmament.

The position of the Flemish Social Christian Party during the parliamentary missile debate lies within the framework of an extension of the position which our party has rigorously defended since the double decision made by NATO on 12 December 1979.

At the meeting of our party's Management Committee on 24 November last in Sint Niklaas, we were still convinced that a short term agreement on the cruise missiles was still possible, and that a reasonable postponement of the first phase of deployment could give the Geneva negotiations an additional chance to succeed. Unfortunately, this was not borne out.

The refusal of the Soviet Union to conclude a separate agreement on medium range missiles no longer left us any choice. Under those circumstances, to postpone the first deployment no longer made any sense. Hence, the CVP feels that the government made the only possible decision.

Mr Gromyko's unequivocal response left us no valid alternative. An unconditional refusal to deploy, as advocated by the Flemish socialists and the People's Union, must be rejected because it is contrary to NATO's double decision.

A postponement is no longer credible, because it has become clear now that we should expect lengthy negotiations.

The CVP voters will understand our position to the extent that it reflects their own concerns and convictions. As a matter of fact, the CVP is the forum for an agonizing debate, which has worried a large number of Christians in Flanders for several years.

Flemish public opinion is deeply divided on the nuclear missile problems. Those divisions can even be found within generations, within families and within social groups.

The CVP should not feel ashamed, on the contrary, about taking a long look at those problems and noting that opinions are sometimes divided as to the paths to follow.

Anyone who really wants to understand our party's position must know that peace negotiations and disarmament remain the cornerstone of our policy. The CVP is firmly determined to continue its efforts to ensure peace and security for our citizens. As a political party with government responsibilities, we cannot take the risks that others may be able to afford.

The aversion to nuclear arms and the thirst for peace expressed by so many people turned the demonstration of 17 March last into an impressive event. Such a peaceful demonstration is the expression of a democratic right and deserves the very special attention of all political officials.

Nevertheless, I continue to regret that through their unilateral stand the organizers broke the pluralistic front of the peace movement. And I deplore that those same people turned the demonstration into a march against the government, against Prime Minister Martens, and against the CVP. But I pay tribute to the thousands of demonstrators who wanted to express not a feeling of aversion toward a political party, but a deep desire for peace as well as a desire to achieve mutual disarmament. The CVP wants to contribute to translate this desire into a political reality. But then the debate for or against the missiles will have to be broadened, and in the coming months we will have to get down to finding a solution also to the other disarmament problems.

The government has reasserted forcefully that any stationing of missiles on Belgian soil is reversible: it could be stopped, or the missiles could even be completely dismantled if the Geneva negotiations produce an agreement.

Furthermore, in order to give those negotiations a maximum chance to succeed, the government has promised to postpone, if the case arises, the stationing of the remaining 32 missiles in 1987 by 6 months.

The CVP wants to make the presence of nuclear arms superfluous on Belgian soil and in all of Western Europe by eliminating the threat presented by the SS-20 missiles deployed by the USSR. This objective should be achieved by means of the negotiations.

And the CVP wants, in consultation with the Allies, to send out new signals to the Soviet Union. It will take new initiatives with a view to further disarmament, confidence and dialogue with the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

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BUDAPEST VIEWS GORBACHEV ARMS PROPOSAL

Proposal Outlined

LD092251 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Text] What exactly is the content of the proposal made by General Secretary Gorbachev over the weekend, and why is the proposal so topical? This is discussed as follows by Istvan Kulcsar and Gyorgy Szentesi:

[Begin recording] [Kulcsar] On a few issues, the general secretary of the Central Committee made some very important proposals to the Americans. It is a question of the basic issues of arms control, notably, that while the discussions are in progress in Geneva, the two sides should suspend research work connected with space and freeze the deployment of strategic and European medium-range nuclear arms. In the interview Gorbachev also said that the Soviet Union is suspending the deployment of those missiles in Europe that have served as countermeasures to the U.S. deployments in 1983-84 of medium-range missiles in West Europe.

I wonder, how does the balance, the equilibrium, of medium-range weapons in Europe look today? I put this question to Engineer Colonel Gyorgy Szentesi.

[Szentesi] According to the Soviet view, before November 1983 there was an approximate balance in Europe in medium-range nuclear weapons. Therefore, without separately detailing the missiles and planes and the warheads targetable by them, the Soviet assessment said that there was a global nuclear balance, although there was a difference in types of missiles and in the number of the missiles and planes. After the beginning of deployment, the Soviet Union took countermeasures because the new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles were deployed in Europe.

[Kulcsar] What was this response?

[Szentesi] There were two kinds of measures: one was that the USSR continued to replace its obsolete SS-4 missiles with SS-20's, and it started to deploy operational tactical missiles with increased range on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

[Kulcsar] The range of the SS-4 missiles is less than that of the SS-20s, but since they were deployed closer to the potential targets, in a certain respect they are equivalent to them.

[Szentesi] Yes. Insofar as their time of flight to target is considerably shorter than that of the SS-20s.

[Kulcsar] Therefore, what kind of balance do we have today?

[Szentesi] In fact, the global balance still exists in Europe today. So the two sides possess identical capabilities.

[Kulcsar] So the European balance of power exists just as it did 18 months ago, only at a higher level of armaments, but obviously in any event at a lower level than it might be if the deployments were to continue?

[Szentesi] That is so, for in exchange for the 572 new U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons, the USSR would be obliged to deploy many more than at present.

[Kulcsar] The competent U.S. leaders have rejected Gorbachev's proposals for the time being, but let us hope that this will not be their last word, as it is in their power to also reply in Geneva, and it is conceivable that by November — which is as long as the Soviet moratorium, the suspension of deployment, will last — a summit meeting might also take place, to which both sides have contributed in principle. We must hope that an agreement will come into being there. [end recording]

U.S. Urged To Reconsider

LD092253 Budapest in English to Europe 2000 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Excerpts] The interview given to PRAVDA by Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is still in the focus of international attention. For "International Newsroom" (Janos Petrovszki) comments:

[Petrovszki] This display of interest is self-evident. This is the first time that the newly-elected general secretary, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, gave a general account of the international situation and therefore his interview presented a picture of the Soviet politician's viewpoint.

The first striking element of this picture is that Mr Gorbachev is not the type of politician to over- or under-dramatize the situation. He takes reality into consideration.

The first international observations on the interview, of course, center on the new Soviet peace initiative. It was not reassuring, but not surprising, that Washington has rejected the proposal, as the United States has for a long time been striving for a military supremacy. A review of the international press makes it obvious that people all over the world are expecting a more far-reaching answer. There are those who point out that the opportunity for reaching an agreement must not be missed.

Mr Gorbachev said it was not only necessary but also possible to reach an agreement, but of course on the basis of reciprocity. Soviet policy is based on the favorable signs reflected in the recent development of relations between the two sides. What is needed now is an agreement on the practical details. [Words indistinct] the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, it is a firm stand for dialogue, and proposed to the United States that in the relations of the two countries, the possibilities for mutual understanding and peaceful development should be sought with more firmness instead of confrontation.

HUNGARIAN PAPER WELCOMES GORBACHEV MORATORIUM

LD101226 Budapest MTI in English 1014 GMT 10 Apr 85

[Text] Budapest, April 10 (MTI) -- Wednesday's MAGYAR HIRLAP carries an editorial commenting on the statement given by Mikhail Gorbachev to PRAVDA. The Budapest paper points out that Gorbachev's analysis was marked by a realistic tone and a comprehensive approach.

'Gorbachev did not only talk of a reciprocal moratorium on the deployment of intermediaterange nuclear weapons,' says the paper, 'but also of a freeze on the entire arsenal of modern warfare. It is a particularly important element of Soviet proposals even if Washington tries to hush it up. If an agreement were reached on the suspension of the development and testing of space weapons and the freeze on the strategic offensive arms of the two countries, the Geneva talks would not be gripped in a vise by the time factor.

'The representatives of the White House, referring to the alleged superiority of Moscow, were once again quick to turn down the proposal for an end to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. However, they can hardly show any opposition to the fact that Moscow welcomed Reagan's proposal for a summit and they most probably share Gorbachev's view that a high-level meeting would give a boost to Soviet-American relations. The idea of the CPSU general secretary that the two world powers should cooperate in the settlement of conflicts is also thought-provoking and encourages action. The survival of acute hotbeds of tension also proves the timeliness of such action,' emphasized MAGYAR HIRLAP.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

FRENCH, FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTERS VIEW CSCE, GENEVA TALKS, SDI

PM261631 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Mar 85 p 8

[Unattributed report: "European Security Dominated Talks"]

[Excerpts] European security was the most important question at the talks between French External Relations Minister Roland Dumas and Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen yesterday morning. The two foreign ministers discussed among other things the CSCE followup conference in Stockholm and the CSCE 10th jubilee in Helsinki this summer. Relations between East and West and the superpower negotiations in Geneva were raised at the meeting which began Dumas' visit to Finland yesterday morning.

Yesterday morning Dumas also met with President Koivisto, with whom he lunched at the presidential palace. Between his meetings with Vayrynen and Koivisto he also visited the Sinebrychoff Museum. Dumas returned to Paris yesterday evening, postponing his planned private visit to Lapland.

In his speech Dumas looked for similarities between Finland and France and mentioned, for example, the two countries' love of freedom and the striving for independence, which have different expressions, however. According to Dumas, France tries to ensure its independence through arms, but at the same time remains loyal to its military alliance, while Finland pursues a peaceful and active policy of neutrality. Dumas hoped that cooperation in the fields of economics, science, and advanced technology will be a new example of the dialogue between countries.

At the dinner Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen said that, despite the setbacks in international politics, Finland has preserved its faith in detente and has not discovered any alternative to it.

"We have been able to note with satisfaction that there has been a mild improvement at least in the international atmosphere," Vayrynen said. He hoped that the superpowers' new negotiations in Geneva will lead to the strengthening of international security at a lower level of military readiness and that it will be possible to prevent a spread of the arms race to space.

Vayrynen reminded his audience that Finland, despite the fact that it is unable to directly influence the outcome of the Geneva talks, has expressed its concern at the problems which new arms technology, particularly low-flying long-range cruise missiles, creates for those countries which seek to win advantages

from it. Vayrynen referred to President Koivisto's hopes that it will be possible to ban this type of weapon totally.

In their talks the two foreign ministers were agreed that an agreement on space weapons is needed, since the new weapon will create military imbalance. To the press Dumas stressed that the U.S. SDI space defenses program, or "star wars," takes risks but does not increase security.

Dumas warned that even though the SDI program is still only in the planning stage it will probably be implemented. The French external relations minister's visit to Finland was delayed by half a day because of the EEC foreign ministers' extended meeting in Brussels dealing with Spain's and Portugal's EEC membership. He arrived in Finland around 0400 hours yesterday morning. Yesterday afternoon Dumas dismissed all allegations that France had made excessive demands, especially in connection with Spain's entry into the Community. France was no more difficult at this meeting than anyone else, Dumas said, giving assurances that France still wants the EEC to be expanded. The negotiations on the questions still outstanding will continue next Thursday [28 March].

In the last few decades the foreign policy debate in France has led to five foreign policy tenets on which there is great consensus, French External Relations Minister Roland Dumas said in his speech to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki yesterday evening. This consensus covers preserving national identity in the power struggle between East and West, the desire to take part in international economic competition, and the desire to take part in the North-South dialogue. The fourth and fifth points in the national consensus are the improvement of human rights and the unification of Europe, Foreign Minister Dumas said. France wants to maintain its dialogue with the Eastern bloc without at the same time exposing its relations with its allies to a threat. The center of gravity in this dialogue is to find solutions which make the process of unification easier, Dumas said.

This is why France is devoting most of its attention to the CSCE process and the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Goals and methods must be therefore be further developed, Dumas stressed.

According to Dumas, France is using its diplomatic contacts to achieve these goals. At the same time Dumas reminded his audience of the French efforts in the negotiations which made the Stockholm disarmament conference possible.

Dumas considers that the attempts to preserve the balance of power must take as their point of departure the lowest possible arms level. The negotiations should start with the discussion of a reduction in the superpowers' arsenals, but at the same time we should not forget conventional and chemical weapons and the negotiations dealing with these weapons. "The French are unanimous in wishing to alleviate the tension between East and West," Dumas said.

Dumas pointed out that France is doing its utmost so that the EEC will be made into a Common Market area as originally intended. Dumas admitted that this market unification process is still only half-completed, but already the Community market is the best trump card Europe has in the world. Europe is after all the biggest market area, the external relations minister said.

France is also aiming at working for a Europe which is united politically, and such a unity would be an important factor in the detente process between East and West.

The French are striving to establish a more just international order which can offer the developing countries better development possibilities, Dumas explained. International trade must not be based on exploitation. We must support countries unwilling to attach themselves to either of the power blocs, Dumas said.

Dumas also explained that the developing countries should be given a reasonable price for their most important products, at the same time as they must make use of low interest rates and create their own stable currencies. The economic interdependence between North and South is such that the Western countries are unable to deal with the economic recession without the Third World, he said.

Dumas also raised the question of what he called "Europessimism" -- a false belief that Europe is lagging behind in technological developments. The problem, according to Dumas, is not inadequate technology, but more a European inability to use its technological "trump card" on the world market.

Dumas believes that the problems surrounding human rights have changed because philosophical thought and differing cultural forms are broad and multiple. According to Dumas, the problem can be solved, however. This can happen in Europe thanks to the Helsinki Final Act, because the implementation of the CSCE Final Act means progress "in the strategic negotiations on human rights." And this could also happen within the UN framework, through negotiations on documents in which we could define the minimum norms for human rights and in which we could itemize the rights and security of individuals.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

GDR, FRG PARTY OFFICIALS DISCUSS CHEMICAL-WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

LD111732 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1505 GMT 11 Apr 85

[Text] Berlin, 11 Apr (ADN) -- The SED Central Committee and SPD Executive Committee's groups of experts for preparation of a joint intitiative for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe met for their fifth round of talks in Berlin today. They briefed one another on the attitude of the two party leaderships on the results of the work done by the two parties' groups of experts.

The SED and SPD leaders consider these results generally positive. The groups of experts have been instructed to clarify the remaining questions. Taking part in the meeting for the SED were Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Gentral Committee; Manfred Uschner, deputy department chief on the SED Central Committee; Prof Karlheinz Lohs, director of the research department for chemical toxology of the GDR Academy of Sciences; Klaus-Dieter Ernst, section chief in the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and Karl-Heinz Wagner, official of the SED Central Committee. Taking part for the SPD were Karsten D. Voigt, chairman of the working group for chemical disarmament and of the foreign policy working group of the SPD parliamentary group, member of the Executive Committee; Egon Bahr, chairman of the Bundestag subcommittee for disarmament and arms control and member of the SPD Presidium; Dr Hermann Scheer, chairman of the disarmament and arms control working group of the SPD parliamentary party and member of the SPD party council, and Dr Use Stehr, disarmament and arms control expert of the SPD parliamentary group.

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY BACKS NUCLEAR PORT VISIT BAN

PM281031 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Mar 85 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Virtual Silence in Labor Party on Defense Policy"]

[Excerpts] Defense and security policy were discussed to a remarkably small extent at the Labor Party's national conference. Is this because the party wants to sweep the disagreements under the carpet prior to the fall elections? "No," party Deputy Chairman Einar Forde told AFTENPOSTEN. "It is undoubtedly the case that defense and security policy issues are not our voters' main concern in the runup to the election," Forde said, admitting that he too was a little surprised that these topics were hardly touched on in the debate.

In its program the Labor Party stresses that the stipulation should still apply that foreign warships docking in Norway should not have nuclear arms on board. The party also wants to implement a limited extension of the possibility of refusing national service on the basis of serious arguments. "It must be the seriousness of the arguments and not their nature which is decisive," the program states.

A statement on peace and disarmament passed by the Labor Party National Conference Saturday [34 March] states that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations has not halted the buildup of nuclear arms. The national conference, which supports the proposal for a freeze as the first step toward disarmament, further stressed that detente policy must be deepened as a prerequisite for strengthening peace in Europe. "The Labor Party will attach great importance to the Stockholm Conference, where military confidence-building measures in particular are being discussed. Real detente also requires that human rights be guaranteed in both East and West, it is stressed."

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

ICELAND'S SDP LEADER HITS NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

LD061424 Stockholm International Service in Swedish 1000 GMT 6 Mar 85

[Text] The newly elected leader of the Icelandic Social Democrats, Jon (Baldin) Hannibalsson, accuses his party colleagues in the other Nordic NATO countries and in Sweden of conducting a confused security policy. Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom is one of those criticized. In a statement handed to journalists yesterday in connection with the Nordic Council session in Reykjavik, Hannibalsson criticizes his party colleagues' ideas about nuclear-free zones in the north. The north is already a nuclear-free zone.

The nuclear threat to the north comes from the Soviet Union, says Hannibalsson, who has in mind the statements by the Swedish military that Soviet submarines are illegally operating in Swedish waters. But for one reason or another the Swedish foreign minister pretends neither to hear nor to see, adds Hannibalsson, who also criticizes Sweden of having double standards in the question of arms sales, chiefly to the Third World.

CSO: 5200/2539

END